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“YOU WANT INSURANCE WITH THAT?” USING
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS
FROM ADD-ON INSURANCE PRODUCTS
TOM BAKER*
PETER SIEGELMAN∗
***
Persistently high profits on “insurance” for small value losses sold as an
add-on to other products or services (such as extended warranties sold
with consumer electronics, loss damage waivers sold with a car rental, and
credit life insurance sold with a loan) pose a twofold challenge to the
standard economic analysis of insurance. First, expected utility theory
teaches that people should not buy insurance for small value losses.
Second, the market should not in the long run permit sellers to charge
prices that greatly exceed the cost of providing the insurance. Combining
the insights of the Gabaix and Laibson shrouded pricing model with the
behavioral economics of insurance, this article explains why high profits
for add-on insurance persist and describes the negative distributional and
welfare consequences of an unregulated market for such insurance. The
article explores four potential regulatory responses: enhanced disclosure,
a ban on the point of sale offer of add-on insurance, price regulation, and
the creation of a new, on-line market. Drawing on theoretical, empirical,
and comparative law sources, the article explains why enhanced disclosure
will not work, the circumstances under which a point of sale ban is
desirable, and why a new, on-line market is preferable to price regulation
in circumstances in which a point of sale ban is undesirable.
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Informed observers of insurance markets have long marveled at the
high prices charged for a wide variety of low value insurance products sold
as “add-ons” to consumers buying other products and services. Examples
include the extended warranties sold with electronics and home appliances,
the credit life insurance and identity theft protection sold with mortgages,
auto loans, and credit cards, and the collision damage waivers and short
term liability insurance sold with car rentals. Unlike iPhones or Gucci
bags, there is nothing obviously cool or distinctive about add-on insurance
products. They are just contingent claims on money – often small amounts
of money – that, like other forms of insurance, protect consumers from
losses that are easy to predict in the aggregate and should, in theory, sell at
prices that are close to insurers’ predicted costs. Yet sellers are able to
charge prices for add-on insurance products that consistently and greatly
exceed the cost of providing the insurance, well beyond what is possible in
other parts of the consumer insurance market. These excess profits have
negative distributional consequences and lead to substantial efficiency
losses.
Insurance regulators have long suspected that these high profits
reveal that there is something awry in the sale of insurance add-ons.
Investigations of credit life insurance in the 1950s,1 collision damage

1

See, e.g., Sunderland v. Day, 145 N.E.2d 39, 39 (Ill. 1957) (interpreting Ill.
Small Loans Act to forbid a lender from requiring – as was apparently common –
that borrower purchase credit life insurance as a condition precedent to the making
of a loan); Leland J. Gordon, Book Review, 25 J. INS. 77 (1958) (discussing a
finding of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly that
significant “abuses in the consumer credit insurance business[,] which included
sales of credit insurance far in excess of money loaned, failure to deliver the policy
to the borrower, payment of excessive commissions, pyramiding of policies by
requiring the borrower to purchase a second policy upon refinancing his loan
without cancellation of the first policy, and failure to make a refund of unearned
premiums”); NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, A BACKGROUND STUDY OF THE
REGULATION OF CREDIT LIFE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE 39-51 (1970) (chapter
entitled “Credit Insurance Abuses”). Interestingly, the volume of scholarly
literature on credit life seems to have peaked in the 1960s, and relatively little has
been written about it since then; Philip H. Peters, How Should Credit Life
Insurance be Regulated, 1958 INS. L. J. 529 (1958) (suggesting problems were
widespread); William T. Beadles, Control of Abuses Under Credit Life and Health
Insurance, 26 J. INS. 1 (1959) (detailing a litany of abuses and suggesting
regulations to counter them).
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waivers in the 1980s,2 and extended warranties in recent years3 have
documented the excess profits earned on the sale of these insurance
products, along with the abusive sales practices that such profits induce.
Yet, regulators have struggled to identify how these excess profits are
sustained. Indeed, an otherwise impressive study by the Competition
Commission of the United Kingdom in 2003 attributes excess profits
earned on the sale of extended warranties for consumer electronics to an illdefined “complex monopoly situation” that the study never really explains.4
Not surprisingly, the Commission’s solution – a set of information forcing
measures adopted in 2005 – has not worked.5
The conceptual problem for the Competition Commission, state
insurance departments, and most other consumer protection agencies that
have examined add-on insurance markets can be traced to the economic
model they use. The add-on insurance product market quite literally “does
not compute” within the standard Insurance Economics 101 framework that
2

See, e.g., Iowa Dep’t of Ins., Proposal to the Market Conduct of Consumer
Affairs (EX3) Subcommittee re: Proposed Model Statute on Collision Damage
Waivers, 1 NAIC Proc. 173 (1985).
3
COMPETITION COMM’N, A REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF EXTENDED
WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC [HOUSEHOLD] ELECTRICAL GOODS WITHIN THE UK,
2003, 1, at 3 available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.
competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2003/485xwars.htm#summary. In
the US, a 1985 lawsuit by Maine Attorney General James Tierney alleged that
retailer Sears, Roebuck used unfair and deceptive trade practices to sell extended
warranties. See State v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. CV-84-133, 1985 LEXIS 239,
at *44 (Me. Super. Aug. 29, 1985). These allegedly included: (a) selling coverage
that duplicated manufacturers’ express warranties that were already included in the
purchase price, and (b) after the consumer had made the decision to purchase the
product, overstating the need for warranties by exaggerating the probability that a
product would fail. Id. While noting that extended warranties were “highly
profitable” for Sears, id. at *51, the court concluded that there were no deceptive
trade practices involved because “the State . . . failed to demonstrate that Sears
misleads customers when it sells maintenance agreements by making them believe
that they must purchase, either through maintenance agreements or through
prospective repair costs, what the law gives them for free.” Id. at *76.
4
COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 3, at 6.
5
Recently, the U.K. Office of Fair Trading – which has shown an appreciation
for behavioral economics – has taken a fresh look at extended warranties, finding
that the extended warranty market remains “unfair and uncompetitive” and
proposing a new round of reforms. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, EXTENDED
WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC ELECTRICAL GOODS, 2012, 1403 (U.K.), available at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/markets-work/OFT1403.pdf. For the OFT’s
interest in behavioral economics, see, e.g., OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, WHAT DOES
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS MEAN FOR COMPETITION POLICY?, 2010, 1224 (U.K.),
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/oft1224.pdf.
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has informed insurance regulation, leaving regulators without a reliable
guide to action. Regulators’ intuition and common sense tell them that
consumers are being exploited, but the dominant conceptual framework in
their field cannot tell them how or why, or what to do to prevent that
exploitation.
When they do try to address the perceived exploitation – as the
Competition Commission did for extended warranties in 2005 – regulators
understandably lack the confidence to go beyond non-controversial
strategies, such as mandatory disclosure or other information-forcing
mechanisms. Disclosure rarely improves consumer markets in any
context,6 and, as the Competition Commission experience demonstrates,
does not provide meaningful protection to consumers purchasing add-on
insurance products. In the end, regulators typically give up. This explains
why, for example, many of the credit life insurance abuses identified in the
1950s and rental car insurance abuses identified in the 1980s persist today.7
The persistence of large profits in add-on insurance products poses
two main conceptual problems for the standard economic analysis
employed in insurance regulation. First, according to that analysis, there
should not even be a robust market for most of these kinds of insurance
products. The expected utility theory that lies at the core of the economic
analysis of insurance teaches, unequivocally, that people should not buy
insurance for low value losses.8 The whole point of insurance under
expected utility theory is to shift money from states of the world in which
people do not need their last dollar very much (their marginal utility of
money is low) to states of the world in which they could put that dollar to
much better use (their marginal utility of money is high). The amounts of
money at stake in most add-on insurance products are simply too small for
that difference in marginal utility to explain consumer behavior. Moreover,
whatever slight difference there may be in the marginal utility of money
between the time a person buys the insurance and the time when she
collects on it is more than offset by the transaction costs involved (even
leaving aside the excess profits). This is Insurance Economics 101.9

6

See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schnieder, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011).
7
See infra text accompanying note 119.
8
See SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT
AND INSURANCE 176, 188 (2nd ed. 2004); Matthew Rabin & Richard H. Thaler,
Anomalies: Risk Aversion, 15 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 219 (2001); KENNETH J.
ARROW, The Theory of Risk Aversion, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING
(1971); John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, 32
ECONOMETRICA 122 (1964).
9
Harrington & Niehaus, supra note 8; infra text accompanying Figure 1.
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Second, even if it did make sense for people to buy add-on
insurance products, the market should not in the long run permit sellers to
charge prices that greatly exceed the cost of providing the insurance.
Excess profits should bring new competitors into the market. Even if most
people are not careful shoppers, some are. Their careful shopping should
benefit all consumers, as sellers compete for the careful shoppers by
This is
reducing prices for the add-on insurance products.10
Microeconomics 101 applied to insurance markets.
As we will explain, the problem is not with economics, per se, but
rather with the failure of insurance law and regulation to move beyond
Economics 101. Behavioral economic analysis has addressed both of the
conceptual problems presented by the 101-level analyses. First, borrowing
from psychological research, behavioral economics provides a compelling
explanation for why people choose to insure against small losses, even at
prices that greatly exceed the cost of providing the insurance.11 Second,
using a simple (in retrospect) equilibrium model, behavioral economics
provides a compelling explanation of why prices for add-on insurance so
often greatly exceed cost, even when sellers operate in a competitive
market for the primary product or service to which the insurance products
are add-ons.12
Of the two parts to this behavioral economic explanation, the
second is decidedly more important for improving insurance law and
regulation. The first part simply puts more rigorous science behind what
regulators, marketers, and ordinary people already knew: people are willing
to pay for “peace of mind” to an extent that goes well beyond what
expected utility theory would predict, especially when they are buying a
10

See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the
Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 630, 638 (1979) (concluding that “the presence of at least some consumer
search in a market creates the possibility of a ‘pecuniary externality’: persons who
search sometimes protect nonsearchers from overreaching firms.”). Moreover, in
their model, if at least one-third of consumers undertake comparison shopping, the
market price will be close to the competitive price in market where all consumers
are informed. Id. at 655.
11
See, e.g., Eric Johnson, John Hershey, Jacqueline Meszaros & Howard
Kunreuther, Framing, Probability Distortions and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 35, 42 (1993); Paul J. H. Shoemaker & Howard C. Kunreuther,
An Experimental Study of Insurance Decisions, 46 J. RISK & INS. 603 (1979). For
an extended treatment, see HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER, MARK V. PAULY & STACEY
MCMORROW, INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS
IN THE MOST MISUNDERSTOOD INDUSTRY (2013).
12
See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer
Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON.
505 (2006).
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product or service that puts their peace of mind in question. Indeed, taken
all by itself, this first part could do more harm than good, at least in relation
to the regulation of add-on insurance products. It is a short step from a
better understanding of why people like peace of mind insurance to the
claim that there is no need to do anything to protect consumers, other than
perhaps mandating certain disclosures, because sellers are simply satisfying
consumers’ legitimate preferences. Some recent writing by highly
regarded law and economics scholars points in that direction, using the
language of consumer sovereignty.13
The second part of the behavioral economic analysis reveals the
existence of heretofore unappreciated “situational monopolies”14 that
require – and hence authorize the use of – more powerful regulatory tools
than mere disclosure to fix. This second part has not yet been taken into
account in the law and economic analysis of insurance. Thus, there is
reason to believe that scholars using consumer sovereignty to support a
light touch to the regulation of peace of mind insurance products might
reconsider their analysis, at least in the context of add-on insurance
products.
It is important to emphasize that we are not merely adding together
two disparate strands of behavioral economics. The combination of the
shrouded pricing/situational monopoly model with the behavioral
economics of low-value insurance yields a key insight into the welfare
analysis of this market that is not present in either story by itself. As we
spell-out in more detail below, the shrouded pricing model explains in
general terms how supra-competitive prices for second-stage or
supplemental products (e.g., razor blades, toner cartridges for laser printers)
can be maintained in equilibrium. In these cases, the second stage product
is an appropriate – or even necessary – complement to the first stage
product: razor blades and toner cartridges have finite lives, and razors or
printers are useless without them. Consumers may have a choice among

13

See, e.g., Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted
O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral
Economics and the Case for 'Asymmetric Paternalism,’ 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211
(2003); Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Consumer Demand in Insurance Markets, 3
ERASMUS L. REV. 23 (2010).
14
The term “situational monopoly” has appeared in the law and economics
literature in the analysis of secured transactions and the application of the contract
doctrine of duress. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured
Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1167-71 (19781979) on secured financing and the competitive advantage that a creditor with a
security interest in after-acquired property enjoys over other lenders and MICHAEL
J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 78 - 101 (1993) on duress.
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competing second-stage products, but they cannot avoid purchasing any
second-stage product at all.
That is decidedly not the case when the second-stage product is
add-on insurance, the purchase of which is irrational to begin with. The
option not to buy at all is not only real, it is compelling (at least to rational
consumers). That, in turn, means that sellers must undertake efforts to
convince customers to buy the add-on insurance product. Moreover, such
efforts are highly profitable because of the supra-competitive prices
charged for add-ons, which implies that all kinds of hard-sell tactics are
virtually compulsory because the marginal return to a dollar spent on
inducing a customer to purchase add-on insurance is high.
The efficiency consequences of such hard-sell practices are not
trivial. Such tactics are deployed against all buyers (whether they actually
purchase the add-on insurance or not), and are properly counted as a waste
of customer and seller time, a real welfare loss that is not present in the
original shrouding model.15 In our view, “merely” protecting
unsophisticated consumers from tactics that redistribute wealth to
sophisticated consumers is a worthy goal in itself, and one that is shared by
most insurance regulators. But the shrouded pricing of small-loss
insurance has efficiency consequences as well, as we discuss below.
This Article is organized as follows. In Part I we describe three
examples of add-on insurance products – extended warranties for consumer
products, loss damage waivers for rental cars, and credit life insurance –
and discuss the irrationality of purchasing these products under a standard
expected utility approach. In Part II we develop a behavioral economic
analysis of these products that helps explain why people buy them and,
more importantly, why competition fails to reduce their prices to something
approaching their cost. In Part III we discuss the implications of this
analysis for insurance regulation, exploring four possible strategies:
improved disclosure of the terms of add-on insurance products, a ban on
the sale of the products as an add-on, price regulation, and the use of
information technology to create a robust market at the point of sale.
Drawing from recent U.K. experience, we recommend a mixed approach
for the three specific products we examine: a ban on the sale of credit life
insurance and extended warranties as add-ons and a new, on-line market
for car rental insurance that customers can access at the car rental desk.
Ours is a more activist and decidedly old school approach – with a
high tech twist for car rental insurance – than forward thinking insurance
regulators have entertained in recent years, but there is new science and a

15

For example, East Coast readers may reflect on the need to check a box on
the Amtrak website indicating that, no, you do not want to buy the $10 travel
insurance on a $60 train ticket.

8

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 20.1

new regulatory environment behind our proposal. The new science is
behavioral economics. The new regulatory environment is developing in
response to the financial crisis of 2008. In the legislative process leading to
the enactment of the Dodd-Frank financial reform statute, state insurance
regulators successfully argued for the exemption of insurance products
from the jurisdiction of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, on
the grounds that state insurance regulation was already looking out for
consumers and that state-based regulation allowed for innovation and
experimentation.
Add-on insurance products present an excellent
opportunity to test that claim.
II. THREE EXAMPLES OF ADD-ON INSURANCE
In this part, we analyze three common forms of add-on insurance:
extended warranties for consumer products, the loss or collision damage
waivers sold with rental cars, and credit life insurance. Extended
warranties – and, in most cases, damage waivers – have negative value in
expected utility terms because the losses they protect against are small and
the price charged for the insurance is high relative to the expected value.
Rational expected utility maximizers should not be risk averse at all over
such small stakes. Credit life insurance and, in some situations, damage
waivers are a bad deal for slightly different reasons: The stakes can
sometimes be high, and thus might be worth insuring; just not when the
cost is so high relative to the expected value.
A. EXTENDED WARRANTIES FOR CONSUMER PRODUCTS
An extended warranty is an optional contract that provides the
purchaser with a longer period of protection from the failure of a specific
product than the standard warranty offered by the manufacturer.16 Extended
warranties differ fundamentally from the manufacturer’s warranties that
are included in the price of a consumer product. Manufacturers’ warranties

16

There are allegations that some major retailers push extended warranties on
products such as power tools that already come with manufacturer’s lifetime
warranties. For example, Home Depot’s Ridgid Power tools come with a lifetime
warranty from the manufacturer, yet some customers complain that they were
nevertheless sold an extended warranty on the item. See, e.g., Scam Man, Rigid
Extended Warranty Scam (Jun. 2, 2012, 2:06 AM), http://www.home
depotsucks.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=11532#p13442 (last visited Jan. 29,
2013) (“[m]ost of these ridged [sic] products are not eligible for an extended
warranty because [sic] they have lifetime service agreement. yet home depot has
the cashiers promp [sic] you to buy them. shows you the greed of home depot and
that is just one scam they do”).
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do have the potential to provide substantial value, but not primarily because
of their insurance function. Rather, the primary value of a manufacturer’s
warranty lies in the quality signal it sends. Consumers rationally conclude
that the manufacturer would not offer a generous warranty if the product
regularly failed within the warranty period and, thus, consumers
appropriately prefer a product with a better manufacturer’s warranty.17
An optional extended warranty, sold at an additional cost, does not
signal high quality. Indeed, our personal shopping experience suggests the
opposite. We have found that, once we have decided to buy a particular
TV/refrigerator/washing machine/sound system at a retail establishment,
the sales person who earnestly persuaded us of the high quality of the
selected item disappears, and a “customer assistant” arrives with news of
other disappointed customers whose very same TV/refrigerator/washing
machine/sound system stopped working shortly after they bought them.
Because the TV/refrigerator/washing machine/sound system might not
actually be as good as it is supposed to be, the customer assistant explains,
the store has arranged for an extended warranty that is available, at a small
additional charge, to protect us from such disappointment.18 This extended
warranty is pure insurance (and almost pure profit for the store). For
example, Business Week reported that extended warranties were
responsible for 50% of Best Buy’s profits and almost 100% of Circuit
City’s profits.19
Data on extended warranties are difficult to come by. As a result,
there is very little empirical social science literature describing their
workings, despite the frequent criticism of extended warranties by
economists and consumer advocates.20 One recent estimate put the size of
17

See generally George Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Warranty, 90 YALE
L. J. 1297 (1981); Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure
and Producer Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977)..
18
This practice turns out to be so well documented in the extended warranty
context that it has a name, at least in the UK: “double hitting.” Retailers “stressed
to [the U.K. Competition Commission] the action they take to stop unacceptable
selling practices, which they have told [the U.K.C.C.] would alienate customers.”
COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 3, at 40. The “unacceptable selling practices”
include “double hitting,” providing “misleading information,” and “persisting in
trying to sell an EW when the customer has declined the offer.” Id.
19
Tao Chen, Ayay Kalra & Baohon Sun, Why Do Consumers Buy Extended
Service Contracts?, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 611, 615 (2009) (using 2003 data from a
large retailer in an expected utility framework that assumes that demographic and
product characteristics affect the purchase of warranties through differences in risk
aversion between consumers).
20
For exceptions, see Pranav Jindal, Risk Preferences and Demand Drivers of
Extended Warranties (Dec. 2012) (working paper) (on file with Smeal College of
Business, Pennsylvania State University), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
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this market at $16 billion,21 but that appears to be a largely impressionistic
number, with no derivation given. Better estimates are available for the
UK – at least, for the consumer electric goods market – thanks to an
investigation by the Competition Commission, which found that on total
electric goods sales of £15-20 Billion in 2001, “18.5 million E[xtended]
W[arrantie]s were supplied . . . .with a total value of nearly £900 million
(including a valuation of free EWs), about 5% of total sales.”22 EWs were
purchased by about one-third of all consumers who bought an electric good
worth more than £50.23 Extrapolating those figures to the US yields a
rough estimate of about $30 billion in electric goods sales in 2010, and
about $1.4 billion in extended warranties sold for these types of products.24
Extended warranties are also sold as add-ons to other products. For
example, the website Warranty Week estimated that the market for
automobile extended warranties in the US represents another $11.2
billion.25
2196033 (using experimental data to decompose demand for extended warranties
on washing machines as a function of risk, and loss, aversion); Chen, Kalra & Sun,
supra note 19. Some economic theorists have modeled the market for extended
warranties. See, e.g., Aidan Hollis, Extended Warranties, Adverse Selection, and
Aftermarkets, 66 J. RISK & INS. 321 (1999) (surveying theoretical literature, and
arguing on the basis of an adverse selection model that sellers of primary goods
should not be able to exclude third-party extended warranties). At least in some
contexts, extended warranties can be used to price-discriminate among consumers,
even when buyers are rational, by increasing switching costs. See Edward
Iacobucci, A Switching Costs Explanation of Tying and Warranties, 37 J. LEGAL
STUD. 431 (2008).
21
See Extended Warranties, WARRANTY WEEK, Nov. 21, 2006, available at
http://www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20061121.html (suggesting that the
total extended warranty market was worth $16 Billion, but not specifying whether
this is a stock measure of the value of warranties in force or an annualized flow).
22
See COMPETITION COMM’N, EXTENDED WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC
ELECTRICAL GOODS, 2003, at vol. 1. p. 3 (U.K.). The OFT recently estimated the
total value of the same market as about £1 billion. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING,
EXTENDED WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC ELECTRICAL GOODS, supra note 5, at 24.
23
COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 21, at 4.
24
See generally, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 2.4.5. Personal
Consumption Expenditures by Type of Product (2013), available at
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=70&Freq=Y
ear&FirstYear=2008&LastYear=2009. There is no precise US equivalent to the
U.K. definition of household electric goods. We used Bureau of Economic
Analysis Table 2.4.5, and included the categories Small Electric Household
Appliances, Video & Audio Equipment, and Information Processing Equipment.
See id.
25
Vehicle Service Contract Administrators, Warranty Week (Sept. 9, 2010),
http://www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20100909.html.
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Extended warranties sold as an add-on to the purchase of a
consumer product are, in expected utility terms, the paradigmatic bad
insurance deal.26 They do not provide protection against any level of loss
for which insurance at the prevailing price makes sense for a rational,
expected-utility-maximizing individual.27 The reason is simple: a rational
consumer cannot be risk-averse for losses that are so “small” relative to her
overall wealth. Classical risk-aversion only applies to large losses, those
big enough to change the marginal utility of wealth. And for almost
anyone buying a $200 CD player or even a $1,000 TV set, the amount of
potential loss – the replacement cost of the item in question – is likely to be
quite small in relation to assets or lifetime wealth. Even risk-averse
consumers should be essentially risk-neutral for small-stakes gambles,28
and recent survey research suggests that consumers in fact are risk neutral
when it comes to extended warranties.29
Consider a consumer who purchases a Sony 55" Class Bravia®
EX620- Series LED LCD HDTV sold by Sears on line for $1619.99.30
According to the Sears website, the extended warranty on this item –

26

See, e.g., David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory to
Meet the Practice of Insurance, in Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial
Services 1, 25-28 (Robert Liton & Richard Herring eds., 2004); Schwarcz, supra
note 13; Rabin & Thaler, supra note 8.
27
Except, possibly, for a purchaser who knows that she or he will use the
product in an unusual manner that poses a high risk of product failure (but which is
not considered misuse, voiding the warranty). The ability of such an individual to
buy the warranty at the regular price represents a market failure, not a justification
for the market. As the OFT observed, some have suggested that extended
warranties may make more sense for liquidity constrained consumers, but there is
no evidence that the purchase of extended warranties correlates with liquidity
constraint. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, EXTENDED WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC
ELECTRICAL GOODS, supra note 5, at 35.
28
John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, 32
Econometrica 122, 122 (1964); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Risk Aversion,
Essays in The Theory of Risk Bearing, 90, 90-91 (1971); Rabin & Thaler, supra
note 8..
29
See Jindal, supra note 20 (experimentally examining demand for extended
warranties on washing machines and concluding that loss aversion, not risk
aversion, explained the demand).
30
See SEARS, http://www.sears.com/shc/s/p_10153_12605_05771742000P?
blockNo=3&blockType=G3&prdNo=3&i_cntr=1314814734858 (last visited Aug.
31, 2011). Sears does note that the price includes a manufacturer’s warranty for
“Service & Support: Limited warranty - parts and labor - 1 year.” Id. (Source
shows a 3-yr warranty).
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dubbed the “3 Year In-Home Master Protection Agreement” – costs an
additional $39.31
Table 1 evaluates the cost/benefit calculations for the extended
warranty. On reasonable assumptions about frequency and cost of repair,
the warranty costs ten times more than its expected monetary value. This
calculation is conservative for at least two reasons. First, we ignore
discounting, meaning that we treat a dollar paid in the future identically to
a dollar paid today (despite the fact that we know that people greatly prefer
dollars today over dollars in the future). Second, as Cutler & Zeckhauser
point out, electronic goods tend to fall in price and increase in quality over
time over time, with the result that the option to repair the product rather
than junk it in favor of a better/cheaper model becomes increasingly less
valuable.32

31

No information about any warranty is available on the main web page
described above. See id. Only after you have “checked out” (clicked the button
signifying that you wish to purchase the TV), are you informed about the
possibility of an extended warranty. See id. This certainly constitutes an example
of “shrouded” pricing. Moreover, although you can choose not to buy the
extended warranty, the default is that it is included; you have to check a “decline
warranty” box to avoid paying for it. See id. Here is how Sears describes the
warranty:
Our coverage goes well beyond the original manufacturer’s
warranty. No extra charge for covered repairs includes all parts
and labor. Cosmetic defects are covered for the first 3 years.
Schedule service day or night by calling 1-800-4-MY-HOME.
Repairs are done by a force of more than 10,000 Authorized
Sears Service Technicians, which means someone you can trust
will be working on your products. Fast Help by Phone - we call
it Rapid Resolution - provides you with non-technical and
instructional assistance. Think of it as a talking owner's manual.
It also includes rental reimbursement and a 25% discount on the
purchase of consumable parts like filters and blades ordered from
Sear Parts Direct (1-800-252-1698). An annual Preventive
Maintenance check can be scheduled at the customer's request.
The No Lemon Guarantee and Product Replacement includes
delivery and installation if applicable. Coverage can be renewed
and is transferable.
Id. The “5 year in-home master protection Agreement” costs $519 (almost 1/3 the
value of the TV set itself). Id.
32
Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 27.
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Table 1: Extended Warranty Calculations
Assumptions
TV Lifetime
Lifetime probability of repair

5 years
33

20%

Annual probability of repair
Prob. of repair in 2 out-years
(not covered by manufacturer’s warranty)

1 - (1-.2)1/5 = 4.3%

Cost of Repair34
Results

$400

Expected Value of Warranty

0.085×$400 = $34.16

Cost of 3 year Warranty

$349

Cost/Expected Monetary Value

≈ 10/1

1 - (1-0.43)2 = 8.5%

B. LOSS DAMAGE WAIVERS (LDWS) IN RENTAL CAR INSURANCE
Insurance against damage to a rented car is a complex maze of
overlapping contracts, state-by-state regulation (or lack thereof) and
insurance law doctrines (subrogation, primary vs. secondary coverage,
etc.). The analytic problems are made worse by the absence of any
consistent data on coverage or pricing. Since Collision and Loss Damage
Waivers are not considered insurance for purposes of insurance regulation
(wrongly in our view), they are regulated separately if at all, and there
appear to be no systematic data on terms or prices.35
Under both CDWs and LDWs, the car owner (the car rental
company) contracts with the renter to waive its right to be reimbursed for
certain kinds of losses suffered while the renter has possession of the
vehicle. CDWs traditionally covered damage from collision only,36 while
33

Id. at Table 5.
This is a guess. Doubling the guess would reduce the cost/expected value
ratio to 5:1, exactly the same as that for the low deductible in the homeowners’
policy that Sydnor investigated. Recall that the risk aversion needed to explain that
choice in expected utility terms would imply that the person would be unwilling to
pay $1000 for a 50% chance to win $1 trillion.
35
California, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada and New York regulate C/LDWs by
statute, apart from the ordinary insurance regulation mechanisms.
36
LDW has been described as a descendant of CDW, which was “A more
restrictive in that it waived the renter’s responsibility for vehicle damage only when
the damage resulted from a collision with another vehicle or object. The broader LDW
option relieves the renter from responsibility for damage that results from virtually
34
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LDWs covered, in addition, damage from such things as vandalism or theft.
But the terms now appear to be used somewhat loosely.37 For simplicity’s
sake, we will refer to all such agreements as LDWs. In essence, what the
consumer buys with an LDW is the right to be free from any liability to the
rental car company for any damage to the rented vehicle. From the
customer’s perspective this certainly feels like insurance, whether
insurance law treats it as insurance as a technical matter or not.
LDWs are typical add-on insurance products. They are always
priced separately from the car rental fee, and are presented to the customer
after the baseline rental price has been announced.38 When shopping online, for example, a typical setup is that the customer first inputs his or her
rental location and dates. A second screen then allows for a choice of
vehicle, and a third screen gives a list of options, including the LDW and
other add-ons such as a booster seat or GPS device. In person, the
transaction is typically structured much the same way – a baseline price is
quoted, and once the renter has agreed to that price, she is then asked if she
wants to “decline” the LDW by checking a box or series of boxes.39
In part because LDWs are not sold or regulated as insurance, they are
apparently only loosely-based on actuarial principles.40 Rental car companies

any cause, including vandalism, theft, and glass breakage.” DENNIS STUTH, RENTAL
CAR DECISIONS: WHAT YOU DON’T KNOW CAN HURT YOU 125 (2005).
37
For example, Alamo’s self-described “Collision Damage Waiver” covers more
than just collision damages. In it, Alamo agrees “to contractually waive [renter's]
responsibility for all or part of the cost of damage to, loss or theft of the vehicle.” See
ALAMO, https://www.alamo.com/en_US/car-rental/reservation/start Reservation.html
(complete online rental form filling in location as “Bradley Intl Arpt (BDL)”, date of
trip, renters age as “25 and up,” then click “continue.” On the next screen select a
rental car by clicking “Add” next to one of the rental vehicles. This will then bring
you to a screen with available “Add-On” features which include a category called
“Protection Products.” Under the “Protection Products” category click the words
“Collision Damage Waiver.”) (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
38
“It is a well-established sales principle that an individual is most susceptible
to . . . upsell efforts [inducements to purchase add-ons] immediately after making
the basic purchase decision.” STUTH, supra note 37, at 30.
39
The purchase of the LDW, while optional, is structured as the default
transaction, so that the renter has to make an affirmative choice not to buy the
coverage. The renter is not asked whether she wishes to buy the LDW, but whether
she wishes to “decline” it by checking a box to that effect. In that sense, the LDW
is more “default-y” than an extended warranty, in which the consumer is asked to
“buy,” rather than to “decline.” On the other hand, the initial quoted price does not
include the LDW, which would give the LDW even more of a default structure.
40
“In contrast to physical damage coverage . . . provided under a personal auto
policy, the LDW daily rate is typically not actuarially based.” STUTH, supra note
37, at 129.

2013

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS

15

obviously need to charge a rate that covers their average loss, but beyond that,
the rate charged for a LDW is highly dependent on competitive factors. It is
not uncommon to find most car rental companies charging nearly the same
LDW rate in a particular location.41 It is therefore difficult to arrive at a
typical cost for LDWs sold nationwide. Writing in 2005, industry insider
Dennis Stuth suggested that rates ranged from $5 to $18 per day.42 That
seems much too low in today’s market, however. Using examples from 3
cities and 3 different rental companies for a Toyota Corolla or similar car (see
Table 2), we found prices for LDWs were in the range of $22-$28 per day,
with an average of roughly $27. Of course, this was a small and non-random
sample (we were unable to uncover any systematic data on pricing), but a
price of $25 per day seems like a reasonable estimate.
Table 2: LDW & Car Rental Rates at Selected Airport Locations, June 26, 2012
Car

Rental
Dates

Midsize

6/26 - 7/1

Location
(Airport)
Hartford

Rental
Company
Avis

LDW
Cost,
per day
$27.99

Car Rental
Base Rate
Per day
$67

Corolla

6/26 - 7/1

Hartford

Hertz

$28.99

$69

Corolla

6/26 - 7/1

Hartford

Alamo

$22.99

$66

Midsize

6/26 - 7/1

Dallas

Avis

$27.99

$40

Corolla

6/26 - 7/1

Dallas

Hertz

$28.99

$39

Corolla

6/26 - 7/1

Dallas

Alamo

$22.99

$31

Midsize

7/3 - 7/8*

Minneapolis

Avis

$27.99

$52

Corolla

6/26 - 7/1

Minneapolis

Hertz

$28.99

$54

Corolla

6/26 - 7/1

Minneapolis

Alamo

$24.99

$56

Average:

$26.88

$52.56

Std. Dev.:

$2.38

$12.89

Source: Rental company websites, visited 6/25/2012
*No availability for 6/26-7/1; dates are 7/3-7/8
Memo Item: MSRP for new Corolla = $17,980.

How much should someone be willing to pay for a LDW? This is a
difficult question to answer because it depends on a great many
idiosyncratic factors, including the extent of coverage under the renter’s

41

Id.
Id.

42
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own personal auto policy 43 and the credit card used to pay for the rental car
in question.44 Some renters are already covered for some or all of the
losses covered by a CDW. For them, there is little or no point in buying
additional coverage that duplicates what they already have. At most, the
LDW will function to reduce their effective deductible to zero.45
Suppose, conservatively, that the renter has no prior coverage that
would make the LDW unnecessary. The renter would then be buying
coverage for an otherwise uncovered loss, at the rate of $25 per day. This
works out to roughly $9,000 per year – far too much for a rational risk
averse consumer to pay for coverage against harm to the vehicle.
One way to see why the LDW is overpriced is to compare its cost
with ordinary automobile insurance. Typical automobile insurance covers
vastly more than the LDW does (including, of course, liability to third
parties, which could easily run many times the value of the insured vehicle
itself), for far less money. For example, the first author’s family auto
policy, which covers three automobiles (including a 2013 Audi A6) and
three adult drivers (one who is under 25), costs about $3,000 per year. Of
that total premium, the first party property insurance coverage costs only
$1100. By this metric, the LDW looks to be a very bad deal, since it covers
less liability at many times the cost.46

43

Damage to a car rented by the policyholder is not covered under the
standard Insurance Services Office PAP form, but some companies in some states
do provide such coverage, which would make the C/LDW (almost) completely
unnecessary. Even when damage to one’s rented car is already covered, there
might be a small side benefit to buying an LDW; since the rental company’s loss
would be waived, the renter would not need to turn to her or his insurer to cover it
and would not risk an increased premium for having filed a claim.
44
Some premium credit cards cover some kinds of losses (usually up to a
relatively low limit) when a cardholder uses the card to rent a car.
45
Even if someone is already covered by his or her own auto policy, STUTH,
supra note 37, at 129, suggests that there might nevertheless be some reasons to
purchase an LDW. These include: (a) Additional drivers: the renter’s own
insurance might not cover a driver who is nevertheless authorized under the LDW;
and (b) Subrogation hassles: When the renter relies on his or her own insurer to
cover any losses, the car rental company typically charges the renter for the losses,
and then forces the renter to collect from his or her insurer. See id. at 130-31. This
may involve considerable time and expense that would be saved by purchasing a
LDW. Although they are not zero, these benefits seem very small for the typical
rental car customer, and we ignore them.
46
The moral hazard resulting from the LDW might lead rental drivers to
behave more dangerously and get into more accidents than they would when
driving their own cars. In turn, this might conceivably drive up the cost of the
LDW relative to ordinary insurance on an owned vehicle. But it is difficult to
imagine that rental drivers are so much more reckless than drivers of their own
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A more standard way to think about the attractiveness of a LDW is
to compare its cost to its expected payout (as we did in Table 1).
Estimating the expected payout of a LDW is complicated, however, absent
data on loss amounts and probabilities. Table 3 presents some back-of-theenvelope calculations. We assume that loss amounts are uniformly
distributed in various ranges or “bins,” and somewhat arbitrarily assign
probabilities to each range.
Table 3: Back-of-the-Envelope Estimate for Expected Annual Loss, Corolla LDW

Loss Amount
$0-$100
$101-$500
$501-$1,000
$1001-$10,000
$10,001-$18,000
TOTAL
Cost of LDW
Ratio: Cost/Expected Benefit

Loss Probability
52.0%
26.0%
13.0%
6.5%
2.5%
100.0%

Expected Loss
$26
$78
$98
$358
$238
$797
$9000

11.3:1

Despite its crudity, the estimated expected loss in Table 3 is an
order of magnitude smaller than the annual cost of a LDW, even with
conservative (i.e., generous) assumptions about loss probabilities. As with
the extended warranty, a LDW looks to be a very bad deal for the
consumer. Expedia’s alternative loss damage waiver plan starts at $9 per
day; that’s still not worth buying in expected utility terms, but it is less than
half the price of the rental car companies’ LDW.47
However, the calculations here are somewhat more complicated
than in the case of the extended warranty. The reason is that although the
expected loss in this context is, at about $800, arguably quite small, there is
cars, especially since so many renters have coverage for their own vehicles that
largely mimics that of the LDW.
47
Car Rental Insurance, EXPEDIA, http://www.expedia.com/daily/promos/
travel_protection_plans/car_rental.asp?opt=1_7 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). The
program was designed and administered for Expedia, Inc.’s clients by Berkely and
is underwritten by Stonebridge Casualty Insurance Company. Id. In California,
Berkely is a service mark of Aon Direct Insurance Administrators; in all other
states Berkely is a division of Affinity Insurance Services, Inc. except AIS Affinity
Insurance Agency, Inc. in Minnesota and Oklahoma, and AIS Affinity Insurance
Agency in New York. Id. The website is interactive, but will not give you a quote
unless you actually rent a car.
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some chance of a much larger loss. If an $18,000 loss represents a nontrivial fraction of lifetime wealth, then risk aversion may come into play,
and the cost/benefit analysis needs to take account of the gains from
substituting a certain payment for an uncertain loss amount. Such
calculations were per se unnecessary in the case of extended warranties
covering small losses.
So, could risk aversion be enough to justify the high premiums
charged for a LDW? The short answer is “No.” We can reframe the issue
of whether the LDW is overpriced by asking how much more than the
actuarially fair value of the loss a risk averse consumer would be willing to
pay as insurance against that loss, given assumptions about her wealth, the
probability and size of the loss, and her degree of risk aversion.48 This
“excess premium” can then be compared to the actual premium charged for
the LDW. We assume utility has the widely-used Constant Relative Risk
Aversion (CRRA) form.49
Kenneth Arrow has argued that on theoretical grounds a CRRA
coefficient of about 1.0 (logarithmic utility) should be reasonable; a
coefficient of 50 is extraordinarily risk averse. Yet as the last row of Table
4 reveals, even an absurdly risk averse individual, with a coefficient of
relative risk aversion of 50, should at most be willing to pay only $1,000
more than the fair premium (of $2,000) to insure against a 10% chance of a
$20,000 loss. That is, the most such an individual should be willing to pay
for insurance against this loss is about $3000, since anything more than this
would make going uninsured the more attractive option. For more
reasonable levels of risk aversion, the maximum premium is between
$2,036 and $2,330. Of course, these are all far less than the roughly $9,000
premium charged for a LDW by rental car companies and less than the
$4,300 premium charged through Expedia.

48

To do this, we find the expected utility of the consumer who purchases no
insurance and faces an uncertain prospect – a gamble. We then determine the
certainty equivalent wealth – defined as the wealth (held with certainty) that gives
the same utility as the gamble does.
49
We use the standard CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility function
of the form

, the limit of which, as ρ approaches 1, is U(W) = ln(W).

According to Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, Modeling Competition
and Market Equilibrium in Insurance: Empirical Issues, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 146,
147,(May 2008), “constant relative risk aversion provides a reasonably good
approximation of individual attitude toward risk, at least in an expected utility
setting.” Somewhat arbitrarily, we set wealth equal to $500,000.
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Table 4: Maximum Willingness to Pay for a LDW as function of Risk Aversion
Assumptions
Wealth, W

$500,000

Probability of Loss, p

10%

Loss Amount, L

$20,000

Fair Premium

$2,000
Coefficient of Constant Relative Risk Aversion, ρ
1*

Certainty Equivalent
Wealth50
Maximum Excess
Premium

2

10

50

$481,963

$481,925

$481,668

$480,885

$36.54

$75.00

$332.00

$1,115.00

*

The CRRA utility function is defined as ln(W) when ρ = 1.

These results make it all the more surprising that, according to one
rental car insurance expert, 19% of renters always bought an LDW and
another 19% sometimes did.51
C. CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE
Arthur Morris invented the modern version of credit life insurance
in the US in 1917.52 Borrowers purchase credit life insurance to guarantee
50

The certainty equivalent wealth is the amount of risk-free wealth that
provides the same utility as the expected utility resulting from the gamble under
consideration. In this context, the gamble consists of wealth of $500,000, a loss of
$10,000, a probability of loss of 10%, and utility function characterized by a given
degree of risk aversion. Since the individual dislikes risk, he is willing to pay
more than the $1,000 expected loss to avoid it. The difference between
($500,0000 minus the certainty equivalent) and $1,000 represents the maximum
excess premium the individual would be willing to pay, and this amount rises as
risk aversion increases.
51
STUTH, supra note 37, at 132 (quoting a 2002 survey performed by the
Progressive group of insurance companies). Of those who bought, 63% said they
did so because they wanted extra protection, but 24% said they bought because
they weren’t sure whether their PAPs covered the loss and 8% said they bought
because the agent pressured them into doing so. Id.
52
Arthur J. Morris, The Origins of Credit Life Insurance, 1957 INS. L.J. 329,
329; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that
Morris’ purpose was to allow the extension of credit to workers with no security or
collateral). It’s worth noting that the practice of buying life insurance to benefit
creditors is much older than this. See generally GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON
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that if they die before repaying a particular outstanding debt (e.g., a
mortgage or a car loan), the insurer will repay the lender. Closely related
products such as credit health or credit disability work in much the same
way, except that they are triggered by an event other than the death of the
insured. The volume of credit life insurance sold in the US was about $770
million in 2010; credit accident and health insurance amounted to an
additional $875 million.53 Credit life is typically sold as an add-on to the
financing of a primary purchase (a house, car, or other substantial
consumer durable), by the entity making (or financing) the original sale –
the car dealership, retailer, etc.54
The first thing to note about credit life insurance is that it does not
directly protect the borrower, her estate, or her heirs. The primary
beneficiary (in a legal and economic sense) is the lender, who is protected
LIVES (1999) (describing the culture of life insurance in England from 1695 to
1775). Morris’s innovation was extending the link between credit and life
insurance to a mass market in a context in which the creditor did not require the
debtor to purchase the insurance.
53
NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE AND CREDIT
ACCIDENT & HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIENCE 2006-2010, 4 (2011). The roughly
30% drop in the volume of net written premiums between 2008 and 2010
presumably reflects the effects of the recession and the decline in overall
consumption expenditures. Somewhat surprisingly, however, there has been a clear
downward trend in the volume of both credit life and credit accident/health since
2001, with a drop-off of 62% over this period. Id. Patricia McCoy points out to us
that under the National Bank Act, national banks are authorized to underwrite and
sell insurance substitutes called “debt cancellation contracts” and “debt suspension
agreements.” 12 C.F.R. § 37.1(a) (2013). It is possible that the drop in credit life
and credit accident insurance reflects a growth in the market for close substitutes –
debt cancellation/suspension contracts. See Barnett, Sivon & Natter, P.C. and
McIntyre & Lemon, P.L.L.C., Debt Cancellation Contracts and Debt Suspension
Agreements, AM. BANKERS ASS’N (May 23, 2012), http://www.aba.com/ABIA/
Documents/36a3b8296aef4474b90d3e3f9a8896feGAODebtCancellationCoalition
Final2810conformed.pdf, for an overview of these contracts from the perspective
of the Debt Cancellation Coalition, of which the American Bankers Insurance
Association is an ex officio participant.
54
We lack data for the US, but a UK Competition Commission report suggests
that stand-alone sales of Protection Payment Insurance (PPI) “are very small
compared to the total number of PPI policies sold by distributors . . . . [T]he standalone market accounts for less than 0.5 per cent of total P[ersonal]L[oan]PPI sales,
and less than 0.1 per cent of total C[redit]C[ard]PPI sales. . . . [Even at] a little
under 9 per cent…, the extent of M[ortgage]PPI policies sold on a stand-alone
basis is still very small.” Market Investigation into Payment Protection Insurance,
COMPETITION COMM’N, 56-57 (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.competitioncommission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2009/fulltext/542.pdf. We strongly suspect the
same is true for the US.
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from the risk that the debtor dies before repaying the loan and the estate
cannot repay it.55 It is true, however, that the purchase of credit life
insurance does reduce or eliminate the risk of foreclosure if the
borrower/insured dies. Some borrowers may want to leave the asset free
and clear to their heirs, or may worry that the heirs can’t afford the
remaining obligations under the loan and would be forced to give up the
asset whose purchase the loan originally financed.
Thus, there are circumstances under which credit life insurance
may provide benefits for the purchaser. Suppose the wage-earning spouse
buys a car for $15,000, financing it with a loan secured by the car. If the
borrower dies before the car loan has been repaid and the surviving spouse
cannot make the remaining payments, the lender can take back the car; and
if the remaining debt is less than the car’s resale value, the lender can come
after the estate for the rest of what’s owed. Thus, there is a risk that one’s
survivor will have to repay the loan, and this risk does impinge on the
utility of the person buying the insurance, thereby providing at least a
superficially plausible motivation for buying credit life insurance. Credit
life replaces the payments remaining at the time of the borrower’s death,
eliminating the risk that the deceased’s estate will have to make those
payments.
Credit life insurance is thus different from extended warranties and
many LDWs for two reasons. First, the amounts at stake in credit life
insurance can sometimes be large enough relative to overall wealth that a
rational consumer might conceivably find insuring these risks attractive.
That is generally not the case with extended warranties and LDWs
(especially for a renter who has a personal auto policy with collision
coverage), where the size of the risks involved is so much smaller. Second,
the value of credit life depends not only on the insured’s risk aversion, but
also on his altruistic concern for the welfare of his beneficiaries, which

55

The lender has many other ways of protecting against this risk, of course,
beginning with charging a higher interest rate to reflect the risk that the borrower
would die before the loan was repaid. Note that the moral hazard problem with
higher interest rates – that they induce borrowers to take on riskier projects – does
not seem applicable in the context of credit life insurance. See Joseph E. Stiglitz &
Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM.
ECON. REV. 393, 401 (June 1981) (suggesting that when lenders can’t observe
borrower behavior, higher interest rates will lead buyers to substitute towards
riskier projects). Indeed, one plausible explanation for the existence of credit life
insurance is that it offers a legal way to charge risky borrowers a higher interest
rate, without running afoul of usury laws. Lenders often require collateral as an
additional means of protection.
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makes it more difficult for an outside observer to be certain when credit life
insurance is a bad deal for an individual purchaser.56
Under ideal circumstances, credit life offers a way for borrowers to
protect their survivors against the risk of having the borrower’s estate
drained by paying off a loan after the borrower dies. As many have noted,
credit life is not a particularly good way to manage this risk – ordinary life
insurance, if it is available, is typically both dramatically cheaper and more
flexible, since proceeds are not dedicated to repayment of a particular
loan.57 This flexibility is especially valuable when the deceased borrower’s
estate is insolvent or if the loan is non-recourse. In either case, the debtor’s
family or other chosen beneficiary, not the creditor, gets the money, surely
the result that is more consistent with the altruistic justification for the
purchase of life insurance.
Moreover, some versions of credit life are even less defensible. For
instance, many subprime mortgages were sold with so-called “Single
Premium Credit Life,” in which the total premium for the life of the policy
is rolled into the initial mortgage. This meant that:
The borrower then pa[id] interest on this amount for the
life of the loan and typically ha[d] not even begun reducing
the loan’s principal balance by the time the five-year credit
life insurance coverage period expire[d]. Consequently,
when a borrower move[d] or refinance[d] out of a
subprime loan after five years, all of the premiums for the

56

That is, credit life – and indeed all life insurance – does not pay the insured,
but rather his or her beneficiaries. Their utility matters to the insured, but only
indirectly. Thus, although we can place plausible bounds on risk aversion, we
cannot as readily put bounds on altruism (as measured by sources outside of
insurance demand). For an attempt to do so using insurance data, see B. Douglas
Bernheim, How Strong are Bequest Motives? Evidence Based on Estimates of the
Demand for Life Insurance and Annuities, 99 J. POL. ECON. 899, 900 (1991),
concluding that “most individuals are in part motivated by a desire to leave
bequests.”
57
Many sources note that if it’s available, ordinary life insurance is typically a
much cheaper way to cover the risk that credit life also insures against. See, e.g.,
Credit Insurance, WIS. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., http://www.wdfi.org/ymm/brochures/
credit/credit_insurance.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2013) (suggesting that “credit
insurance is expensive in comparison to other forms of insurance” and offering a
chart showing that a typical policyholder, age 30 and in good health, could expect
to pay $342 per year for $50,000 of credit life insurance, while the same amount of
term life – which of course pays cash, and is not restricted to the repayment of a
particular debt – would cost only $70, only one-fifth as much).
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terminated insurance [were] . . . stripped directly out of the
borrower’s home equity.58
Financing the entire credit life premium, rather than paying it month-bymonth, thus worked out to be a very poor deal for virtually every consumer.
Many other credit life practices have been highly criticized for over
50 years. Among the abuses discussed in a report by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners report in 197059 were: excessive
coverage (selling coverage for more than the amount borrowed), failure to
refund unearned premiums when the debt was paid earlier than required,
coercive selling practices, bad faith claims-adjusting, failures to inform the
policyholder of coverage,60 overcharging, and a host of other practices.
While regulatory changes beginning in the 1960s attempted to restrict the
most blatant of these abuses,61 their efficacy is unclear, and at least some of
these practices continue in some jurisdictions.
Rather than focusing on the worst practices, however, it’s better to
consider a typical policy. Unfortunately, data on a “typical” product are not
easy to come by,62 but the Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions
furnishes the details of one assertedly representative example.63 Using this
example, supplemented by some actuarial data, we can do a very
conservative back-of-the-envelope calculation on the payback from an
average credit life insurance policy, as summarized in Table 5.

58

ERIC STEIN, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF PREDATORY LENDING
5 (2001), available at http://www.selegal.org/Cost%20of%20Predatory%20
Lending.pdf. Under bans from state regulators and pressure from public opinion,
the worst of these practices were abandoned by most sub-prime lenders in the mid2000’s.
59
For an extensive discussion, see NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra
note 1, at 39-52.
60
Borrowers were sometimes sold policies bundled with the primary loan,
and were not even informed that they were being charged for coverage. In such
cases, the estate of a borrower who died would not know to make a claim on the
insurer.
61
NAT’L ASSOC. OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 1, at 52-87.
62
This in itself is interesting. Much as Daniel Schwarcz found with home
insurance, it appears to be very difficult to shop for credit life insurance on-line,
see Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1263 (2011): we were not able to uncover any recent rate quotes or sample
policies.
63
WIS. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 57.
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Table 5: Hypothetical Credit Life Valuation
Assumptions:
Male, 35

Sex, Age

$15,000

Amount of car loan

4

Years to repay

$2,917

Interest/finance charges64

$265

Cost of credit life

$8,172

Average Balance owed at death, if death occurs65

0.00175
0.0072

Annual probability of death66
Total probability of death during 4 year life of loan

Results:
$58.84

Expected balance owed at death

$20.98

Expected interest/finance charge67

$79.82

Total Expected Payout from Credit Life
Ratio: Premium Cost/Expected Payout = 3.3:168

Suppose a 35-year-old male in average health borrows $15,000 to
purchase a car, with no down payment. According to the Wisconsin
Department of Financial Institutions, a typical credit life insurance policy
costs the borrower $265. That amount protects an average balance owed –

64

Wisconsin DFI apparently assumes an effective annual interest rate of 9.4%.
Assumes that if the borrower dies, on average, it will be at month 24,
halfway through the life of the loan. (We inflate the value of credit life insurance
by not discounting future cash flows to present value. Were this amount to be
discounted to its present value – as seems appropriate – it would be 20 percent
smaller.)
66
Source: http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html for annual death
probabilities.
67
Wisconsin DFI apparently assumes that the entire stream of interest
payments are protected by credit life, which implies that the appropriate number is
$2,917 x 0.0072 = $20.98. But this is clearly conservative. A borrower who dies at
month 24 owes only the interest on the remaining balance outstanding, which is
roughly one-half of the total interest. (Again, since the interest would have been
paid over the 24 months following the borrower’s death, the present value of the
remaining interest payments, as of the date of death is only $797.80, when
discounted at the borrowing rate of 9.4 percent. That amount discounted to the date
the loan is signed is only $667).
68
With appropriate discounting of principal and interest payments insured by
credit life, this ratio would be about 5:1.
65
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over the 48-month life of the loan – of $8,170. The average 35-year-old
male stands a 0.72% (0.0072) chance of dying before age 39. Even
assuming that the entire interest and finance charges would still be owed if
the borrower died, the purchase of credit life insurance would prevent an
expected monetary loss of only $79.82. Of course, one should not expect
that premiums would be equal to the expected payout, since such
actuarially-fair pricing could not cover any of the other costs associated
with running the insurance company. But at just over three to one, the ratio
of expected payout to premium cost is extraordinarily low: not as low as
the ten to one ratios for extended and damage waivers but still much too
low to result from anything approaching rational behavior. Only someone
who assigns astronomically high value to the wealth or consumption of his
heirs should find this kind of ratio appealing. Even then, as noted earlier,
there are typically much cheaper ways to protect against this kind of risk
than through credit life.
Further proof of the problematic nature of credit life comes from
data on industry loss ratios, which are calculated by dividing incurred
losses by earned premiums.69 According to state-by-state data compiled by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in 2009, the
loss ratio on credit life insurance averaged 44.1% for the US as a whole in
the period 2003-2007.70 Louisiana, Nebraska, South Dakota and Nevada
all had loss ratios below 33%, and even the best states – Virginia, New
York and Vermont – had loss ratios of only about 55%. Compared with a
loss ratio of over 90% for group life insurance,71 it’s pretty clear that credit
life purchasers are not getting a good return for the premiums they pay.
These low loss ratios continue, despite the NAIC’s proclamation, in 1959,
of a resolution that “provided that any loss ratio for credit life insurance

69

If a credit life insurer pays out $100 in losses in a given year and collects
$150 in premiums, its loss ratio is 2/3. From a consumer’s perspective, the higher
the loss ratio, the better, other things equal. Low loss ratios suggest that the
premiums consumers pay are too high relative to the coverage they receive for
incurred losses. (An actuarially-fair product would have a loss ratio of 1, which
would of course leave no room to cover expenses.)
70
This is the weighted five-year aggregated loss ratio, using states’ credit life
losses as weights and was computed from data in NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS,
supra note 52. Using a shorter 3-year window does not make a substantial
difference. The standard deviation of the loss ratio across states was 8.6%.
71
The highly profitable nature of credit life is underscored by the virtual
absence of any underwriting requirements for such policies.
See, e.g.,
UsLifeCredit Life Ins. Co. v. McAfee, 630 P.2d 450 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981)
(failing to ask about policyholder’s medical history did not bar recovery by
insured’s estate, even though policyholder knew she had cancer when she applied
for credit life policies).
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below 50 percent would be considered to produce an excessive rate,”72 and
despite many attempts to enforce such a minimum over the succeeding 50
years.
To recap: credit life looks to be a bad deal for consumers for
several reasons. First, even in principle, it’s not clear why borrowers
should want it, although a strong bequest motive could explain some of the
demand for credit life. Second, there are often substantially cheaper ways
of covering the same risks covered by credit life. Third, the worst versions
of credit life are virtually certain losers for the insured, and even average
policies look to be a bad deal, unless consumers place extraordinarily high
value on protecting their heirs. Finally, the very low ratio of claims paid to
premiums collected implies that consumers are not getting enough back for
their premium dollars, especially as compared to widely available
alternatives.
III.

THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS OF ADD-ON INSURANCE
PRODUCTS

The add-on insurance market poses two challenges to the standard
economic analysis of insurance markets. First, the add-on insurance
market largely consists of expensive insurance against relatively small
losses, a combination that is unequivocally bad for consumers in expected
utility terms. Second, sellers are able to sell the insurance at prices that far
exceed the cost, notwithstanding what appears to be a robustly competitive
market for the product or service to which the insurance is connected.
Extended warranties clearly pose both of these challenges. The
damage waiver and credit life insurance situations are a bit more
complicated. For a car renter with a personal auto insurance policy that
includes collision coverage, a damage waiver functions simply to reduce
the collision deductible to zero and, thus, is economically equivalent to an
extended warranty – providing high cost insurance for small losses. But a
car renter who does not have other collision coverage does face a small risk
of a modest loss. Similarly, credit life insurance benefits can easily pay off
in amounts that represent real money. These kinds of losses might barely
be worth insuring, just not at the prices prevailing in the add-on insurance
context.
In this Part we set out the behavioral economic explanation of why
consumers like these products and why sellers can charge such high prices
for the insurance, even in what appears to be a competitive market. We
note that scholars and regulators have been skeptical about credit life for

72

NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 1, at 69.
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similar reasons since at least the 1950s,73 so the behavioral critique is not
new in spirit, even if some of the substance is novel.
A. THE APPEAL OF INSURANCE AGAINST SMALL LOSSES
We begin by reviewing why insurance against small losses is
generally a bad deal in expected utility terms.74 The explanation begins by
assuming that people are risk averse and that it is this risk aversion that
motivates insurance.75 Risk aversion can be understood as a consequence
of the declining marginal utility of money (meaning that people derive less
benefit from each additional dollar that they possess). Insurance reduces
financial risk by taking money from people, in the form of premiums,
during times when the marginal utility of that money is comparatively low
(they need it less, because they have more of it) and giving them money, in
the form of claim payments, at times when their marginal utility for that
money is high (they need it more because they have less of it, owing to the
loss). Thus, a rational, risk-averse person should be willing to pay more
than the expected value of a future financial loss to prevent that loss from
occurring.
In a world of perfect information and no transaction costs, people
would completely insure against all risks for which they could purchase
fairly-priced insurance. Of course the real world is very different. For
present purposes, the key difference is transaction costs. Insurers have to
charge customers more than the present value of the expected loss, because
insurers have to pay their employees, the rent on their headquarters, and so
forth.
Insurance is a good deal in expected utility terms when the
additional utility attributable to risk aversion exceeds the transaction costs
and profits embedded in the insurance premiums. Other things equal,
insurance that protects people from losses that are large in relation to their
income and other assets is more valuable than insurance against small
losses, because insurance against large losses provides a bigger marginal
73

See sources cited supra note 1.
The uselessness of insurance for small losses is analyzed in detail in the
sources cited supra note 8.
75
There might be other motivations for purchasing insurance aside from
classical risk aversion. For an extended treatment, see HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER
ET AL., INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS IN THE
MOST MISUNDERSTOOD INDUSTRY (2013). For a brief survey, see, e.g., TOM
BAKER & PETER SIEGELMAN, Behavioral Economics and Insurance Law: The
Importance of Equilibrium Analysis, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir eds.) (forthcoming
2014).
74
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utility boost. Conversely, higher transaction costs or profits make
insurance less valuable, because less of the premiums go to pay loss costs.
Most add-on insurance products are a bad deal on both of these dimensions.
The losses covered by add-on insurance tend to be small in relation to
consumer assets. Moreover, the extra amount that consumers pay for the
risk spreading services provided by add-on insurance is very high in
relation to other kinds of insurance.76
Consider, as a useful point of comparison, the choice of deductible
in homeowners’ insurance. Should a consumer choose a policy with a $250
deductible, a $500 deductible, or a $1000 deductible? Choosing a low
deductible in a homeowners’ insurance policy is, from an expected utility
perspective, similar to buying an add-on insurance product that provides a
comparable amount of financial protection. (That is, choosing the $250
deductible instead of the $500 deductible is just buying an additional
insurance policy that covers losses in the range of $250-$500, at a cost
given by the difference between the two coverage plans.) Recent excellent
research by Justin Sydnor precisely identifies the cost and expected benefit
of different deductibles in the homeowners’ insurance context,
demonstrating that expected utility theory cannot explain why consumers
choose low deductibles.77 This analysis is directly applicable to add-on
insurance products.
Importantly, however, the institutional context in which consumers
choose the size of their insurance deductible differs significantly from that
in which consumers choose whether to buy an add-on insurance product.
As we will see, this difference in context nicely sets up the behavioral
economic explanation for sustained high profits in add-on insurance (and
the absence of such excess profits in low deductible insurance).
Sydnor uses data from a large homeowners’ insurer to demonstrate
that a substantial majority of consumers choose a deductible that is
dramatically too small to be justified by any reasonable level of risk
aversion or future expected claims. For example, many consumers choose
a $500 deductible, rather than the $1,000 deductible they might have
picked instead. The $500 deductible policy costs about $100 more than the
$1000 deductible policy. Given typical claiming rates, the average
expected monetary benefit from the additional coverage is about $20. This
means that consumers pay $100 to receive an expected $20 monetary

76

Strictly speaking, not all that extra amount is a “transaction cost” as that
term is used in economics. A significant amount is profit. For present purposes,
this detail does not matter.
77
Justin Snydor, (Over)insuring Modest Risks, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON.,
Oct. 2010, at 177, 178 (showing that among the consumers insured by the
company that provided the data, 83% choose a deductible that was too low).
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benefit.78 That is not as bad as the ten to one ratio we found in extended
warranties and damage waivers, but it is worse than the three to one ratio in
credit life insurance.79
To justify the lower deductible on risk aversion grounds, a rational
consumer would need to have a utility function that was so astronomically
risk-averse that she or he would almost-literally never be able to get out of
bed.80 As we discussed earlier, risk aversion varies across individuals, and
depends – somewhat loosely speaking and in very abstract terms – on the
curvature of the individual’s utility function in wealth/utility space, as
illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Risk Aversion and Risk Neutrality

Utility
Flat Slope = Low Marginal
Utility of Wealth

A’s Utility

B’s Utility
C’s Utility

Steep Slope = High Marginal
Utility of Wealth

Wealth

A highly risk averse person such as A (represented by the solid
curve) has a marginal utility of wealth that declines very rapidly as her
wealth increases (a highly-bowed utility function in wealth/utility space).
Conversely, someone such as person C, who is completely risk neutral, has
78

Id. at 196.
Recall that using more realistic assumptions produced a 5:1 ratio for credit
life insurance, right in line with Sydnor’s 5:1 ratio for the low deductible. See
supra text accompanying note 67.
80
Rabin and Thaler, supra note 8, at 226-27.
79
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a constant marginal utility of wealth (a straight-line utility function
represented by the dotted line in Figure 1). Person B (represented by the
dashed curve) is more risk averse than C, but less-so than A, since B’s
marginal utility declines more slowly than A’s as wealth increases.
As we explained, economists use a quantitative measure, called
the “coefficient of risk aversion” to estimate the curvature of the utility
function and hence, to measure an individual’s degree of risk aversion.81
Empirical studies estimate plausible values for the coefficient of relative
risk aversion to be in the single digit range, i.e. from 0 (risk neutral) to 9.82
Buying the lower deductible is a rational economic decision only if one’s
coefficient of relative risk aversion is implausibly (and astoundingly) high:
between 1,840 and 5,064. Someone with a coefficient of relative risk
aversion of 5000 would turn down a bet that offered a 50/50 chance of
either losing $1,000 or gaining any amount of money (including, say
$1,000,000,000,0000).83
Why do so many people – for example, about 25% of the
purchasers of consumer electronics in the UK84 and 19% of car renters in
the US85 – buy something that is such a bad deal in expected utility terms?
Camerer et al. describe one hypothesis in evocative terms. People who buy
extended warranties are cognitively challenged “Homer Simpsons,” who
mistakenly think the warranties are a good deal, perhaps because they
overestimate the cost of a repair or the frequency with which products fail
and misunderstand the value of insurance against such relatively small
losses.86 We will call this the “mistaken calculator” hypothesis. The
81

The coefficient of relative risk aversion is defined as
′′
/ ′
,
where U″ is the second derivative of the utility function and U′ is the first
derivative, evaluated at some given wealth level W. This is the so-called
“Arrow/Pratt” measure of risk aversion. See Arrow, supra note 8, at 94-95; Pratt,
supra note 8, at 123, 135-36. Informed readers will realize that we are finessing a
conceptually important issue, since risk aversion is measured only at a given point
along an individual’s utility function.
82
Syndnor, supra note 77 at 178.
83
Id. at 190, Table 3.
84
See U.K. Competition Comm’n, supra note 3, at 4; Chen et al., supra note
19, at 615 (explaining that 31% of consumers in their data purchased an extended
warranty during their observation period at one U.S. retailer and that extended
warranties “constitute approximately 33% of all purchase occasions,” suggesting
that some people bought more than one).
85
Stuth, supra n. 37 at 132.
86
See Camerer et al., supra note 13, at 1254 n.144, writes that,
[I]n a classic Simpsons episode, Homer was having a crayon
hammered into his nose to lower his I.Q. (Don't ask.) The writers
indicated the lowering of his I.Q. by having Homer make ever
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behavioral decision research suggests a second hypothesis, under which
consumers buy the warranties as an emotional risk management device that
reflects their (irrational but real) aversion to both loss and regret, and their
mental accounting.
1. Emotional Risk Management
Behavioral economics offers a variety of potential explanations for
preferring low deductibles and other forms of excessive insurance. We
begin with regret aversion, which involves the present recognition that we
will in the future evaluate our past decisions based on what actually
happened, rather than (as in the expected utility analysis) based exclusively
on what it was possible for us to know at the moment a decision is made.87
Michael Braun and Alexander Muermann developed a model for insurance
demand that adds regret aversion to the expected utility calculation and
conclude that regret aversion leads otherwise rational actors to “hedge their
bets” by buying insurance for low value losses.88
Regret aversion interacts with “mental accounting” – putting
money into different mental categories with different emotional or other
values – when people buy insurance against small losses, especially when
that purchase is combined with another purchase, sometimes called
“reference pricing.”89 The add-on insurance premium is categorized as an

stupider statements. The surgeon knew the operation was
complete when Homer finally exclaimed: “Extended Warranty!
How can I lose?”
Several readers pointed out that there is no need to put “cognitively challenged” in
front of “Homer Simpson,” but we are aware that not all readers are as familiar
with Homer Simpson.
87
Following a classic article, regret is associated with having made a choice
that works out badly. In their terms, “compare the sensation of losing £100 as a
result of an increase in income tax rates, which you could have done nothing to
prevent, with the sensation of losing £100 on a bet on a horse race.” Graham
Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational
Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON. J. 805, 808 (1982).
88
See Michael Braun & Alexander Muermann, The Impact of Regret on the
Demand for Insurance, 71 J. RISK & INS. 737 (2004). Although this is not relevant
to the present analysis, regret aversion leads people to buy less insurance than they
should for severe but infrequent losses.
89
See Pranav Jindal, supra note 20 at 6, 16 (providing an explanation and test
for “reference pricing” in the extended warranty context); Richard H. Thaler,
Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCIENCE 199 (1985).
See also Viviana Zelizer, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1995). Our favorite
example is Orly Ashenfelter’s explanation of how to use mental accounting to
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increase in “cost” rather than as a “loss,” making the premium payment less
painful. By contrast, the financial consequences of the potentially
insurable future event are categorized as a loss and over-weighted because
of the emotional distress associated with loss.90
As Eric Johnson and his collaborators first fully explained in the
insurance context in 1993, people experience gains and losses from a
reference point. People value the first dollar of a gain the most and each
additional dollar of gain less. At the same time, people hate the first dollar
of a loss more than any additional dollar. In other words, they have a
declining marginal disutility of loss that mirrors their declining marginal
utility of gains. That means that people often will pay dearly to avoid a
small “loss.” In the add-on insurance context, they pay what feels like a
small additional cost to avoid the emotional distress associated with a
larger future loss.
Behavioral economics offers several other explanations for add-on
insurance products. The availability heuristic – judging an event’s
probability by a particularly vivid example of that event – surely affects the
purchase of all three of our examples.91 The endowment effect – loosely,
the tendency of people to prefer what they “have” just because they have it
– likely impacts the purchase of extended warranties, and may explain why
people buy the warranty once they bought the product, even though they

drink great wine for nothing: buy cases as an “investment” and then pay nothing
when you later drink a bottle.
90
Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 42.
91
JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 153 (4th ed. 2007). See
generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Availability: A Heuristic for
Judging Frequency and Probability, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1973). In
the add-on insurance context, the availability heuristic could lead purchases to
generalize from the examples of product failure, accidents, or death provided by
the salesman to conclude that the likelihood of those events occurring was much
larger than they, in fact are. In comments, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan (personal
communication) put the point this way:
Dropping your iPhone, toppling your television, spilling water
on your laptop – these are events that are really easy to imagine.
Furthermore, when the salesperson asks, "Would you like to pay
for insurance against theft, breakage, hardware malfunctions,
software malfunctions, lightning strikes, etc.?" it becomes very
easy to call to mind ways in which your iPhone might meet its
demise.
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did not plan to buy the warranty before.92 The availability of the insurance
(which as a general category is something that responsible people buy93),
together with the salesman’s helpful explanation of the benefits and the
satisfied people who have bought it, can make purchasing the add-on
insurance seem like the right thing to do.94
These heuristics work together to make purchasing the insurance
feel like the right thing to do. As a result, many consumers are willing to
pay a small additional “cost” to protect themselves against the negative
emotions associated with a future “loss” that looms larger than it rationally
should. While this process could be described in terms of mistakes about
probabilities, we think that it is better understood as emotional risk
management: paying for peace of mind
2. Tests of the mistaken calculator vs. emotional risk
management explanations
A recent article by Marieke Huysentruyt and Daniel Read (H&R)
reports the results of survey research into the purchase of extended
warranties that provides some support for both the mistaken calculator and
the emotional risk management hypotheses, while concluding that
emotional risk management offers the better explanation.95 Using
convenience samples that were weighted toward people with a greater
immediate need for money and, thus, more disinclined than usual to spend
92

Jonathan Baron explains that the endowment effect is a kind of status quo
bias, in which “people are unwilling to give up their endowment, which they now
‘have,’ for what they would otherwise prefer to it.” Baron, supra note 91, at 297.
93
See TOM BAKER, Risk, Insurance and the Social Construction of
Responsibility, EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND
RESPONSIBILITY 33, 38 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002).
94
In comments, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan also offered a useful description of this
point:
[S]ometimes an apparently neutral question or offer actually
conveys some normative expectations. This is true for trivial
questions like, "Would you like to wash your hands before we
eat?" to the more serious: "Would you like to preserve your
infant's cord blood?" People are being offered these weird
insurance products and don't know what the prudent or
responsible choice is. The limited information they have based
on the offer is that apparently a market for these products exists.
95

See Marieke Huysentruyt & Daniel Read, How do People Value Extended
Warranties? Evidence from Two Field Surveys, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 197,
215 (2010).
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money today to buy future protection, H&R asked people to imagine
buying a washing machine. They then asked two sets of questions that
were directly related to an extended warranty offered in connection with
that purchase. One set of questions elicited their evaluation of the expected
financial value of the extended warranty.96 A second set of questions
elicited their assessment of the emotional benefits from purchasing the
warranty.97 They also asked a third, unrelated, set of questions that
measured the cognitive capacities of the participants.98
The answers to all three sets of questions were correlated with the
participants’ predicted likelihood of buying the extended warranty. People
who placed a higher financial value on the extended warranty were more
likely to say they would buy it.99 People who scored higher on the
cognitive tests placed lower (but still inflated) financial values on the
extended warranty and, thus, were less likely to say they would buy it.
People who highly valued the emotional benefits were more likely to say
that they would buy it. The first two correlations support the mistaken
calculator hypothesis; the third supports the emotional risk management
96

These questions inquired into the fair price was for the warranty, the market
price for the warranty, how often the washing machine would break down during
the extended warranty period, and how much it would cost to repair the machine if
it broke down. Id. at 203-04.
97
Using a seven point Likert-scale, they asked participants to agree or
disagree with six statements about the warranty:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

It would give me peace of mind.
If I didn’t buy it and the washing machine broke down, I
would feel a
lot of regret.
It would be comforting to have the protection of the
warranty.
Even without the warranty I would not worry about repair
costs.
I would feel more stress without the warranty.
Hopefully I won’t need a repair, but I would rather not take
the risk.

Id. at 207.
98
They used the Cognitive Reflection Test discussed in detail in Shane
Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES
25, 26-29 (2005).
99
It was the predicted cost of the breakdown that most strongly affected the
perceived financial value, rather than the predicted frequency of the breakdown.
This is an example of probability neglect. See Huysentruyt & Read, supra note 95,
at 208 (showing how participants generally overestimated the cost of repair and
consequently overestimated the actuarial value).
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hypothesis. Among these correlations, however, the emotional benefit
assessment was by far the strongest.
Notably, the relationship between the emotional benefits reported
by the individuals and their responses to the other two sets of questions was
independent. In other words, the perceived emotional benefits strongly
affected the willingness to buy the extended warranty, without affecting the
expected financial value of the warranty. This same result holds true for
participants with higher cognitive capacities. Higher cognitive functioning
participants were less likely to buy the warranty, but that effect came
entirely through their lower estimates of the expected financial value of the
warranty, not through their emotional benefit score. Put another way, even
the higher cognitive functioning people had heterogeneous assessments of
the emotional benefits of an extended warranty, and the differences in those
assessments strongly affected their reported willingness to buy the
warranty.
Taken as a whole, the H&R result supports the emotional risk
management hypothesis more strongly than the mistaken calculator
hypothesis as an explanation for the demand for extended warranties.
Some people were willing to buy extended warranties because they greatly
exaggerated the costs of repairs, but more people – including the
cognitively advantaged – were willing to buy the warranties because they
highly valued the “peace of mind” the warranties provide. The logical
extension of this finding is that, to at least some degree, people already
know that the price for extended warranties significantly exceeds the
expected cost for the company selling the warranty. People are willing to
pay that (high) price because they value the emotional benefits the
insurance provides.
A very recent working paper by Pranav Jindal provides some
additional support for the emotional risk management explanation.100
Jindal used conjoint analysis, a survey and statistical technique in which
subjects choose among different combinations of features that are presented
in a manner that allows the researcher to determine the relative importance
of those features to the subjects.101
Jindal presented his subjects – executive and full time MBA
students – with choices of washers and optional extended warranties.
100

See Jindal, supra note 20.
The idea is similar to hedonic pricing models in economics. In both, the
goal is to uncover valuations for individual attributes of a complex product. For
example, new car buyers assign different weights to speed, looks, mileage,
reliability, and so on, and the methods allow researchers to discern (average)
valuations attached to each attribute. See generally Paul E. Green & V. Srinivasan,
Conjoint Analysis in Consumer Research: Issues and Outlook, 5 J. CONS. RES. 103
(1978).
101
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Importantly, he informed these, presumably numerate, subjects about the
frequency and cost of the repairs that would be covered by the extended
warranties, thereby reducing the likelihood that they would be “mistaken
calculators.” He varied the choices presented to the subjects along a
variety of dimensions, including the price of the washer, the price of the
extended warranty, the probability of washer failure, and the cost of the
repair. Using the resulting data Jindal then applied logistic regression and
Bayesian modeling techniques to evaluate how subjects weighted the
different features and to develop different models of the choices.102
Consistent with past experience (over half had previously
purchased an extended warranty),103 the subjects frequently chose the
extended warranties offered in the surveys. Significantly, they were more
likely to choose the warranty if they had already chosen to buy the washing
machine than if they were offered the washing machine and warranty as a
As with Sydnor’s
package, suggesting an endowment effect.104
homeowners insurance, ordinary expected utility analysis did a poor job of
explaining the choices, requiring implausibly high levels of risk aversion.
Allowing for loss aversion and mental accounting significantly improved
Jindal’s ability to estimate a model that closely predicted the actual
choices.105
While the details of Jindal’s analysis are complex, the bottom line
is that incorporating loss aversion and mental accounting into the model led
to a better alignment with choices, and more plausible estimates of risk
aversion, than taking a pure expected utility, Economics 101 approach.
While Jindal’s research cannot rule out the mistaken calculator hypothesis,
the fact that there was significant variation in the preferences of his “good
calculator” subjects and that this variation can be explained in good
measure by differences in loss aversion lends support to the conclusions we
reached on the basis of with the H&R results. People who are more loss
averse place a higher value on the peace of mind that the warranties
provide.

102

Consistent with standard practice in Bayesian modeling, Jindal selected a
random set of cases to hold out of the models and then used the models to predict
the choices made in those cases as a measure of the predictive quality of the
models. Jindal, supra note 20, at 26.
103
Id. at 15.
104
Id. at 20 (“The two stage choices in the sequential survey could lead to a
sense of ownership of the washer in the second stage, which manifests itself in a
higher willingness to pay for the warranty”); Id. at 22 (“[S]ubjects are slightly
more loss averse and have a higher intrinsic preference for warranties in the
sequential study”).
105
Id. at 35-36.
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3. An important equilibrium point
As a result of these behavioral regularities, “Humans” (real people
subject to ordinary behavioral biases) sometimes pay a great deal more for
their insurance than would “Econs” (imaginary people who always behave
as strictly rational expected utility maximizers).106 Sydnor estimates, for
instance, that other things equal, “homeowners could expect to save
roughly $4.8 billion per year by holding the highest available deductible”107
instead of buying more expensive coverage.
As Sydnor points out, however, estimates of this sort can be
seriously misleading as a guide for regulation, because they ignore the way
markets equilibrate. Indeed, Sydnor concluded that the insurer he studied
did not earn excess profits on its low-deductible policies, even though
consumers “overpaid” for these policies relative to the expected value of
the low deductible. That’s because low-deductible consumers had higher
claim rates, presumably due to the presence of adverse selection. The lowdeductible consumers, who had private information about their own
elevated likelihood of making a claim, chose policies that reflected this
information. In fact, those with a $500 deductible had about a 50 percent
higher claim rate than those with a $1000 deductible, by various measures
that controlled for the fact that people with a $1000 deductible cannot make
a claim for a $900 loss.108
I may be able to get a better view at the ball game if I stand up, but
this does not imply that everyone can simultaneously get a better view if we
all do so. Similarly, Sydnor concludes that “[i]ndividual customers could
benefit financially by avoiding over-insuring modest risk. However, if all
homeowners changed their behavior, the company would likely need to
raise insurance costs or create a new higher deductible in order to separate
the more and less risky customers . . . . [I]f all customers had standard risk
preferences, the new market equilibrium would not necessarily be welfareimproving for the customers.”109

106

RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008).
Sydnor, supra note 77, at 187.
108
Roughly 3-3.5% for the $500 deductible, vs roughly 2% for the higher
deductible. Id. at 198. It is important to control for the fact that those with a lower
deductible can make claims (e.g., for between $500 and $1000) that those with a
higher deductible cannot; thus, it is appropriate to use the rate of claims in excess
of the higher deductible for this comparison. Some of the increased claiming may
be the result of moral hazard. Teasing out which is a complex matter that was not
necessary for Sydnor’s purposes. Cf. Liran Einav et al., Selection on Moral
Hazard in Health Insurance, (NBER, Working Paper No. 16969, Apr. 2011),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16969.
109
Sydnor, supra note 77, at 198.
107
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To this point in the analysis, it is easy to see the appeal of
insurance against small losses and, by extension, the appeal of the
consumer sovereignty defense of a light touch to the regulation of that
insurance. Colin Camerer and colleagues and Daniel Schwarcz follow this
line of reasoning in arguing that mistakes can and should be corrected by
disclosure, but that if consumers are buying, for example, extended
warranties because of loss or regret aversion, or as relief for “anxiety,” they
should be free to do so, because restricting their ability to make such
decisions would leave them (subjectively) worse off. 110
What the consumer sovereignty defense misses, however, is the
institutional context. When insurance is sold as an add-on, the resulting
equilibrium can, in effect, require the seller to exploit vulnerable
consumers in order to compete in the market for the base product to which
the add-on insurance is attached. Understood in this way, regulation
protecting consumers from sellers pushing add-on insurance also frees up
sellers to compete on the basis of what everyone understands to be their
core function: selling the base product. We explain this institutional
context and the equilibrium effects next, before turning to the distributional
and efficiency benefits to be gained from regulating add-on insurance.
B. EXPLAINING THE HIGH PRICES CHARGED FOR ADD-ON INSURANCE
We begin with the “shrouding” model of two-stage or ‘tied’
purchases developed by Gabaix and Laibson.111 We summarize that model
here, stressing its prediction that when some actors are subject to a
plausible behavioral anomaly – an anomaly that is consistent with observed
behavior in the add-on insurance market – inefficient and discriminatory

110

Camerer et al., supra note 13, at 1253-54, noting that consumers purchase
what seem to be extravagantly over-priced extended warranties and suggesting that
the problem could be solved by disclosing the true frequency of repair because:
“[i]f disclosure reduces warranty purchases by reminding consumers of the low
chance of product breakage, then purchasing the warranty would have been a
mistake rather than a preference. If informed consumers continue to purchase the
warranties, then it is quite possible that they have good reason to do so, however
unfathomable that decision may seem to an economist.”; Schwarcz, supra note 13,
at 31, “[A]rgues that the insurance demand anomalies . . . can plausibly be
explained as sophisticated consumer behavior to manage emotions such as anxiety,
regret, and loss aversion. Moreover, the capacity of insurance to address these
negative emotions is not necessarily an artifact of manipulative insurance sales or
marketing. Rather, it may be a sophisticated and informed strategy on the part of
consumers to manage emotions that exist independently of insurers’ (and their
agents’) sales efforts.”
111
Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 12, at 505–07.
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terms can survive in equilibrium even if a substantial portion of consumers
are careful shoppers.112
The shrouding model imagines a two-step purchase process of
exactly the sort that takes place with add-on insurance products. In the first
step, a consumer purchases a base good or service, and then in the second
step optionally makes a secondary purchase that is somehow tied to the
first. Gabaix and Laibson use examples such as a laser printer and
replacement cartridges, a hotel room and telephone charges, and a car
rental and a pre-paid tank of gas.
In constructing their model, Gabaix and Laibson recognize that
consumers are not all alike in their shopping behavior. To simplify, they
divide consumers into just two types: “myopes,” who don’t think about the
possibility of future “add-ons” when they make their initial purchase, and
“sophisticates,” who do. Consumers make the initial purchase in a
competitive market, in which the prices charged by all sellers for the base
product are completely observable. That first purchase then exposes the
buyer to an optional add-on purchase from the same seller, in a market in
which the price for the second purchase is unobservable at the time the
initial purchase is made (unless one inquires about it). We think it is
helpful to think of the second stage purchase as taking place in a
“situational monopoly” in which the seller has a captive market for that
purchase.113 As Gabaix and Laibson observe, the second stage price – for
the cartridge, the telephone charges, or the add-on insurance – typically is
significantly above the marginal cost of providing the good or service. One
could presumably buy an extended warranty separately from the primary
purchase, but this turns out to be rare in practice,114 with the result that
112

By contrast, models with heterogeneously informed consumers but no
behavioral anomaly suggest that inefficient pricing is unlikely to survive an
equilibrium. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 10, at 638 conclude that “[t]he
presence of at least some consumer search in a market creates the possibility of a
‘pecuniary externality’: persons who search sometimes protect nonsearchers from
overreaching firms.” Moreover, in their model, if at least one third of consumers
undertake comparison shopping, the market price will be close to the competitive
price in a market where all consumers are informed. See id. at 653. But there are
grounds to be skeptical about this dynamic. See Ben-Shahar & Snyder, supra note
6, at 742-49 (concluding that the empirical history of mandated disclosure has
shown that there has been a history of failure in employing mandated disclosure to
assist consumers in making choices in the market).
113
See supra, n. 14.
114
OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 5, at 87 (indicating that 69% of
extended warranties were purchased from the retailer/shop that consumers
purchased the insured product from). Patricia McCoy (personal correspondence)
points out to us that after she refinanced her own mortgage, she received numerous
unsolicited offers for credit life insurance from insurers that were unaffiliated with
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most extended warranties are sold at decidedly supra-competitive,
monopoly-like prices. Their shrouded pricing model provides an
explanation for why.
The explanation begins with the observation that in a competitive
market, sellers must earn zero profit on the combination of TV set and
extended warranty. Since the second stage monopoly allows the seller to
extract supra-competitive prices for the extended warranty, the prices on
TV sets must therefore be lower than they would be if they were sold on
their own. Suppose now that a firm tries to compete by offering a lower
second-stage price – e.g., on extended warranties – than its rival, and by
alerting potential customers to the fact that its rivals charge more (“Come
buy from us – we charge less for our extended warranties”). Doing so has
two consequences. First, it educates the rival’s sophisticated consumers that
the rival is using high profits on the add-on to subsidize low prices for the
TV. The sophisticates will thus prefer to buy the TV from the rival (at the
cross-subsidized price) and avoid the rival’s high add-on charges. They
can do this by substituting a competitively-supplied extended warranty for
that offered by the seller or, better yet, by not buying one at all and relying
instead on savings or a credit card to replace the product if it breaks.
Importantly, however, this advertising will have no effect on the rival’s
myopic consumers, who aren’t paying attention to the second-stage
transaction at all.115 Thus, competitive attempts to unmask a rival’s high
add-on prices will only succeed in driving sophisticated customers to the
rival, and will not do anything for the firm providing the educational
information. Hence, there will be no reason for any firm to try to unmask
its rivals’ high add-on fees, which can then persist in equilibrium.
To bring this point home, try shopping for a rental car using
Expedia or other web-based travel sites. All show a “total price” that is the
base charge in Gaibaix and Laibson’s terms. None show the price for the
collision damage waiver or supplemental liability insurance in any easily
comparable way. If you spend enough time on the website you can find
that information, but nowhere is it combined and presented in a table for

her lender. She suggests that a separate market is possible (at least for those who
do not purchase insurance from the lender at the time of borrowing), but that the
disorganized state of the market and the inability of consumers to make
comparisons creates a somewhat similar situational monopoly, if perhaps for
different reasons.
115
Consistent with the shrouded pricing model, the U.K. Office of Fair
Trading reports that more than half of the people who purchase extended
warranties had not considered purchasing an extended warranty before purchasing
the covered product. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 5, at 36 (only 39%
of extended warranty holders agreed that they had intended to take out an extended
warranty before purchasing the insured product).
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easy comparison. Interestingly, Expedia offers a collision damage waiver
that can be used at any car rental agency and that is much less expensive
than those sold by the rental car companies.116 If the market for collision
damage waivers was competitive, rental car companies would not be able
to charge so much more than Expedia. A “sophisticate” who wants a
collision damage waiver will buy it from Expedia and rent the car from the
company with the cheapest base charge.
We take some comfort from the fact that the existence of
situational monopolies has been understood for a long time. Writing in
1958, Philip H. Peters, a Vice President at John Hancock Life Insurance,
diagnosed the problem in credit life insurance as follows:
[A]buses [of consumers] are possible because borrowers
who take out personal loans or who buy on time are a
captive insurance market. Their lack of knowledge, their
need or their diffidence makes them receptive when the
lender or dealer suggests that the loan be insured, and they
are usually unable to defend themselves against excessive
charges or other overreaching. In these circumstances,
competition among insurance companies does not protect
the borrower. Insurers are competing for the lender’s
patronage, not the borrower’s; the lender is interested in a
high premium because his commission or dividend will be
higher if the premium is larger.117 (Emphasis supplied).
The presence of the situational monopoly undercuts the consumer
sovereignty defense of a light touch, disclosure-only approach to the
regulation of add-on insurance products.118 Even if consumers are not
“mistaken” in purchasing add-on insurance and, instead, are motivated to
purchase that insurance by genuine (albeit irrational) fears or anxieties, it
does not follow that they should over-pay for the insurance they purchase,
as the shrouding model predicts and the evidence we reviewed in Part I
shows to be the case. Even if the add-on product meets some real need that
116

Expedia, Frequently Asked Questions, EXPEDIA CAR RENTAL INSURANCE,
http://expediacri.berkelycare.com/product/contact-us/faq.jsf (last visited Sept. 28,
2013); Expedia, Why Should I buy?, EXPEDIA CAR RENTAL INSURANCE,
http://expediacri.berkelycare.com/product/home.jsf (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
117
Neither Peters nor the U.K. Competition Commission invoke consumer
irrationality to explain the absence of competitive pricing in credit life. Peters,
supra note 1; U.K. COMPETITION COMMISSION, supra note 3 at 3-10.
118
See Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 39 (interventions monopolizing genuine
consumer preferences for the benefit of those consumers are troubling because they
undermine welfare economics and consumer sovereignty).
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was not the product of seller-created pressure, framing, or advertising,
consumers should not have to pay vastly more for such insurance than it
costs to provide.
The situational monopoly that Peters identified – and that the
shrouded pricing model explains – suggests a market failure that regulation
could potentially address, even if insurance is purchased for “legitimatebut-non-standard” reasons such as regret- or loss-aversion. The market
failure arises not from consumer motivation per se, but from the way such
motivations shape the resultant market equilibrium and reduce the ability of
competitive market forces to protect consumers from overpaying.
In this regard, add-on insurance products present a very different
case than low deductible homeowner’s insurance. People who choose the
low deductible homeowners’ insurance policies might appear to overpay
for their insurance, because the low deductible is over-priced in relation to
the expected benefit of the deductible considered in isolation. Yet, as
Sydnor’s equilibrium analysis reveals, they do not actually overpay for
their insurance as a group, because they have higher claim costs. Their
preference for the low deductible functions as a sorting device that
identifies them as more costly to insure.119
Add-on insurance also functions as a sorting device. But that
sorting device has little or nothing to do with the cost of providing the addon insurance. Instead, it sorts consumers according to their foresight and
vulnerability to the shrouded pricing dynamic. The people who buy add-on
insurance overpay for that insurance, compared to what would be paid in a
competitive market, because the shrouded pricing dynamic gives the seller
the ability to charge a situational monopoly price. 120 This price provides
119

Sydnor’s research suggests that the availability of different levels of
deductibles in homeowners’ insurance facilitate what one of use has called “risk
classification by design.”
See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and
Responsibility After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 1577, 1588 (2011) (a reduction in plan variation fosters “risk classification by
design” which is the creation of separate risk pools as individuals self-select into
different health care products according to their self-assessed health risk status).
This is, of course, exactly what the famous Rothschild/Stiglitz model shows is the
only possible (Nash) equilibrium in a world of asymmetric information. See
Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. OF ECON.
629, 633 (1976). The idea is to induce separation (self-selection) by offering a
menu of policies such that: (i) both policies earn 0 profit, given who buys them and
(ii) the high-deductible policy is cheaper but excludes just enough risk so that the
high-risk group prefers the low-deductible policy. Id. at 636-37, 646.
120
Huysentruyt & Read, supra note 95, at 217(“The central feature of a
functioning market is that because providers compete for the business of
customers, prices are pushed downward, and consumers can get the best deal with
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ample incentive to push people into buying protection that they don’t really
need or would be much better off buying somewhere else. The extra
profits the retailers earn from that insurance reduces the base price that
everyone pays for the underlying product or service, meaning that – as in
the shrouded pricing model – the people who are vulnerable to the
situational monopoly subsidize those who are not.
Moreover, if regret-aversion is the motivation for buying an add-on
insurance product, it is not clear that the product in fact increases welfare in
the manner that the defenders of consumer sovereignty assert. If there were
no extended warranties available, the consumer could not experience regret
for having failed to purchase one. Thus, a policy-maker who was
convinced that regret-aversion was the reason for consumer purchase of
insurance product could ban the insurance with no loss in welfare. This is a
case where supply creates its own demand. If we think the demand is
welfare-reducing, we can eliminate the supply and the demand at the same
time.
1. Efficiency Consequences of Add-on Insurance
Ending the redistribution of wealth from myopes to sophisticates is
in our minds sufficient justification for regulatory action to eliminate
situational monopolies. The justification is strengthened to the extent that
the demand for add-on insurance products is seller-induced in the first
place. But there are efficiency losses associated with add-on insurance as
well, stemming from a key institutional fact that is not captured in Gaibaix
and Laibson’s model: the retailer’s sales efforts.
In the original shrouded pricing story, sellers do not need to induce
customers to buy the second stage product – if you own a laser printer, you
can’t use it for long without purchasing replacement toner cartridges. But
add-on insurance is qualitatively different, because customers can and often
do purchase the primary product (TV set, car rental) without ever needing
to buy the insurance. We suspect that relatively few consumers would
independently request extended warranties if they were not urged to buy
them by sellers (though there may be more people who would continue to
buy them in the future having first been persuaded to do so). At a
minimum, the sellers are taking advantage of the availability heuristic (by
the minimum cognitive effort – they do not have to combine breakdown
probabilities and repair costs because warranty sellers have done it for them. To a
first approximation, all consumers have to do is choose or reject the best deal
amongst those available. If a consumer believes that a warranty is worth three
times its objective value, but finds that she can buy it for one third of that price, she
will buy it and obtain the benefits from knowing she has obtained a bargain as well
as the warranty itself.”)
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highlighting the possibility that the product will fail plus the certainty of
death), the endowment effect (by selling the extended warranty in a second
step, after the customer has decided to buy), and regret aversion (by
causing consumers to imagine a future regret that would not exist absent
the over-priced insurance). Quite likely they are doing even more to
manipulate buyers, as the U.K. Competition Commission reported.121 It
would be astonishing if they were not, given the truly extraordinary profits
that sellers earn on add-on insurance.
Seller efforts to induce consumers to purchase unneeded add-on
insurance are a waste of salesperson and consumer time: Simply charging a
higher price for the TV set and abandoning the extended warranty
altogether would free up resources for more productive uses. A recent
story in the New York Times gives a sense of the inefficient practices
involved. According to one whistle-blower, Staples (the office products
store)
[h]as in place a set of incentives that make it unpleasant, to
put it mildly, for staffers to sell a computer without a
whole bunch of accessories, particularly a service plan.
Staples . . . has a system called Market Basket that tracks
how many dollars’ worth of add-ons each staffer sells.
[E]ach time you sell a computer, you need to sell, on
average, $200 worth of other stuff. And that average is
carefully tracked. Sales staffers who aren't meeting their
goals are coached, and if that doesn't work . . . there will be
disciplinary action that can lead up to termination;
underperformers can also end up with lots of night and
weekends shifts or even a reduction in scheduled hours.122

121

Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 872 (1991) long ago pointed out that a few
“home run” sales (those with extraordinary markups) accounted for a significant
proportion of a new car dealers’ profits. The pursuit of such large markups
plausibly drives much of the hard sell behavior for which car sales are well-known,
and an analogous set of incentives operates in the add-on insurance market. See
also U.K. COMPETITION COMMISSION, supra note 3, at app. 2.1 (list of
unacceptable practices).
122
Moreover, store managers who can’t keep their storewide “Market Basket”
numbers up face “conference calls with district managers” and other discipline.
One store manager was told: “‘If you can’t do the job, you can go sell fries at
McDonald’s.’” David Segal, Selling It With Extras, or Not at All, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/your-money/sales-incentivesatstap les-draw-complaints-the-haggler.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0&emc=eta1.
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As a result, sales personnel seeking to keep their Market Basket
average high will actually refuse to sell a computer to a customer who
declines to purchase the extended warranty. This practice is common
enough to have a name: “Walking the customer,” “because consumers are
essentially shooed out the door empty-handed” if they want to buy a
computer without the warranty.123 While it is difficult to quantify the time
and hassle consumed by such hard-sell tactics, anyone reading the customer
complaints about these practices would recognize that they generate
considerable frustration.
These last observations suggest a possible role for regulation that
would attempt to make extended warranties and other forms of add-on
insurance a better deal for consumers by addressing the market failure
attributable to the situational monopoly enjoyed by the product retailer.
IV.

REGULATORY STRATEGIES

There are four potential regulatory strategies to address the
situational monopoly prices charged for add-on insurance: mandating
enhanced disclosure, banning the sale of the insurance as an add-on,
regulating the price of the insurance, and using information technology to
eliminate the situational monopoly. Enhanced disclosure has been tried
many times, including in the add-on insurance context, and the evidence
shows that disclosure does not work, at least not for add-on insurance
products. By contrast, banning the sale of the insurance as an add-on
works well, perhaps even too well in some contexts. We recommend
banning insurance add-on sales when consumers do not really need to
purchase insurance together with the primary product or service, such as
extended warranties and credit life insurance. But a ban goes too far when
some consumers need to be able to buy the insurance as an add-on. The
one example we have identified is when a consumer without a personal
auto policy rents a car, but there may be other examples that have not

123

David Segal, A Hard Sell on the Extras, Revisited, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/your-money/another-look-at-a-hardsell -on-extras-at-staples-stores.html?emc=eta1. For another recent example,
consider the practice of overbilling for collision damage waivers. Tara Siegel
Bernard, A Quick Electronic Signature at the Car Rental Office, and Then Trouble,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/06/your-money/forcar-renters-signing-on-the-electronic-tablet-may-mean-trouble.html?emc=eta1.
According to one source, Dollar Rent a Car charged at least 100 consumers for
collision damage waivers that they had explicitly denied to purchase by checking a
box on an electronic data entry form. Whether this kind of overbilling represents a
deliberate policy or simply a computer glitch, it is clear that the profitability of
CDW’s drastically reduces the incentives to correct this problem.
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occurred to us. Price regulation could help protect consumers from the
situational monopoly pricing in such situations. We greatly prefer the
fourth strategy, however: using information technology to eliminate the
situational monopoly. There is some precedent for this approach. The
Office of Fair Trading in the UK is in the process of implementing an
information technology solution as a result of their investigation into why
the Competition Commission’s disclosure strategy for extended warranties
didn’t work. This part briefly describes these four strategies and explains
our recommendations among them.
A. ENHANCED DISCLOSURE
Historically, enhanced disclosure has been the preferred free
market regulatory strategy, including for add-on insurance.124 Omri BenShahar and Carl Schneider have recently described in great detail the
failure of disclosure as a regulatory strategy.125 One need not endorse their
across-the-board rejection of disclosure to agree with their conclusions in
the add-on insurance context. The shrouded pricing model fits the add-on
insurance product too well to expect disclosure to work. This conclusion is
borne out by the available evidence. A highly regarded U.K. government
agency – the Competition Commission – recently tried a well-calibrated
enhanced disclosure approach for extended warranties. It failed.
The Competition Commission conducted an investigation of
extended warranties sold in connection with consumer electronics,
producing an impressive and extensive report that we have relied upon for
some of our empirical assertions about extended warranties.126 The
Commission’s principle recommendation was to mandate advertising of the
extended warranty price along with the price of the covered product,
thereby allowing consumers to shop on the basis of the combined price.127
The Commission also proposed three reforms designed to reduce the
likelihood of the customer being pressured into buying the extended
warranty: (1) obligating the retailer to provide an offer of an extended
warranty that could be accepted at any time during the first 30 days after
the purchase (so the consumer could think about it); (2) requiring the
warranties to be cancellable with full refund rights for the first 30 days and
on a pro rata basis for the life of the warranty; and (3) obligating the retailer
to provide an informational booklet at the time of the sale that would
explain to the consumer how to get an extended warranty from an
124

See Camerer, et al., supra note 13, at 1254; Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 42.
Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 6, at 742-43.
126
See U.K. COMPETITION COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 15-16 (summary of
the study).
127
Id. at 10.
125
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independent third party provider.128 All four reforms were adopted by
regulation, effective April 2005.129
Taken together, these reforms reflected the Commission’s
conclusion at the time that the excess profits from extended warranties
resulted from a combination of (a) collusion among retailers to refrain from
advertising the extended warranty prices and (b) improper selling practices.
Because retailers know that they can make so much money from pressuring
customers into buying overpriced extended warranties, the retailers collude
to preserve their collective ability to charge excessive prices, or so the
Commission seemed to suggest.
We are skeptical that retailers could successfully collude in this
manner, however. There are hundreds (maybe even thousands) of retailers
offering extended warranties, and it seems highly implausible that they
could collusively agree to maintain high prices without chiseling. If
making the price of the extended warranty more transparent would actually
change the behavior of consumers, such that they would prefer to buy the
product from the seller with the cheapest price for both the product and the
warranty, then some retailer in the crowded and, to our eyes, intensely
competitive consumer electronic product market would at least try
competing on that basis.
The behaviorally-informed shrouded pricing model offers a much
more compelling story about how supra-competitive pricing could be
sustained in equilibrium, without any resort to implausible assumptions
about collusion. The shrouding model accepts the behavioral decision
research finding that people regularly depart from the rational actor model,
focuses on the fact that people are not all the same in this regard, and then
incorporates an equilibrium analysis that takes into account the behavior of
both buyers and sellers. Thus, at a minimum, it provides a much more
compelling explanation for the observed evidence of over-priced extended
warranties than does the Competition Commission’s story about seller
collusion.
Our skepticism is supported by the fact that profits from extended
warranties on consumer electronic products in the UK continue to be very
high, despite the reforms, and the U.K. Office of Fair Trading still sees the
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A minority of the Commission would have limited point of sale extended
warranties to a maximum of one year.
129
The regulation as adopted allowed for a 45 day cancellation period. See
COMPETITION COMMISSION, EXTENDED WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC ELECTRICAL
GOODS: A REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF EXTENDED WARRANTIES ON DOMESTIC
ELECTRICAL GOODS WITHIN THE U.K., (December 2003), at 10 (U.K.), available at
http://www.competitioncommission.org.uk/inquiries/completed/2003/warranty/ind
ex/htm; http://www.legislation.gov.uk.uksi/2005/37/contents/made.
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market as “unfair and uncompetitive.”130 As the shrouded pricing model
would predict, disclosure did not work. The Office of Fair Trading
conducted a follow-up investigation that concluded in 2011 that disclosure
is not working and recommended, instead, recommended an information
technology solution that would eliminate the situational monopoly. British
retailers recently accepted that recommendation as an “agreed remedy,”
perhaps to avoid the ban that we recommend for extended warranties in the
add-on context.131 We discuss this information technology solution below.
1.

Why more information is unlikely to be effective

Ben-Shahar and Schneider provide an elegant taxonomy of the
reasons why mandatory disclosure regimes almost never provide much
protection for those they are designed to benefit. First, regulators can
rarely design appropriate disclosure regimes that adequately specify what
needs to be disclosed and what constitutes sufficient disclosure. Second,
even when they want to comply in good faith – and this is only sometimes
the case – disclosers invariably struggle to interpret the disclosure mandate,
assemble the required data, and communicate it in meaningful ways. And
finally, consumers routinely ignore the information disclosed (i.e., they fail
to read contract terms, nutrition labels and so on), fail to understand the
terms, even when they are aware of them, and fail to make appropriate use
of them, if they’re understood.132 As Ben-Shahar and Schneider put it:
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See Rupert Neate, OFT to look into extended warranties, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 15, 2011, Bus. Section at p. 3 (reporting that the Office of Fair
Trading (OFT) is going to examine the £750M market for extended warranties for
electrical goods again; one in four customers purchase extended warranties; and
the warranties are still seen by OFT as “unfair and uncompetitive.”). Prices of
extended warranties have declined at traditional retailers since the reforms, but that
appears to be the result of competition from internet retailers and big box stores.
See Evaluating the Impact of the Supply of Extended Warranties on Domestic
Electrical Goods Order 2005, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, 5-6, (October 2008),
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/oft1
024.pdf.
131
Market Review of Domestic Electrical Goods, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING
(June 27, 2012), http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/markets-work/othermarketswork
/electrical-goods/.
132
It strikes us as ironic that Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donohue
and Thaler – all distinguished behavioral economists who have made careers out of
demonstrating that most of us are less-than-fully rational most of the time –
suggest disclosure as the preferred regulatory solution for dealing with Homer
Simpson problems. See Camerer, et al., supra note 86, at 1254.
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[M]andated disclosure rests on false assumptions: that
people want to make all the consequential decisions about
their lives, and that they want to do so by assembling all
the relevant information, reviewing all the possible
outcomes, reviewing all their relevant values, and deciding
which choice best promotes their preferences. These
assumptions so poorly describe how human beings live
that mandated disclosure cannot reliably improve people’s
decisions.133
Consider applying this schema to the disclosure of information
regarding, say, extended warranties. One might be tempted to imagine that
the first prong – deciding what needs to be disclosed and how – could be
satisfied fairly easily (albeit at a non-trivial cost): retailers would need to
compile and disclose information on the probability and cost of repair for
each item on which a warranty is offered. That is, a consumer purchasing
an extended warranty on the Sony TV discussed earlier134 might be told:
“This TV has a 2.5 percent chance of needing a repair during the warranty
period, and that repair costs, on average, $400.” But characterizing the
relevant probability of repair is not straightforward, especially for new
products. And cost-of-repair data are also probably difficult to describe
and subject to considerable misrepresentation. Moreover, disclosure would
have to be regulated as to its timing in the transaction, its precise wording,
and so on. These all pose considerable challenges.
As to the second prong – implementing the disclosure regime –
since sellers earn substantial profits from the extended warranties, it seems
obvious that they would have a strong incentive to manipulate the
information disclosed in an effort to make the warranty look more
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Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 6, at 705. Cf. Andrei Shleifer,
Psychologists at the Gate, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 1080, 1089 (2012) (reviewing DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW):
Faced with bad choices by consumers, such as smoking or
undersaving, economists as System 2 thinkers tend to focus on
education as a remedy. Show people statistics on deaths from
lung cancer, or graphs of consumption drops after retirement, or
data on returns on stocks versus bonds, and they will do better.
As we have come to realize, such education usually fails.
Kahneman’s book explains why: System 2 might not really
engage until System 1 processes the message. If the message is
ignored by System 1, it might never get anywhere.
134

See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
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appealing. One way to do this would be to exaggerate the frequency or
cost of repairs (but only, of course, after the consumer has agreed to buy
the TV). Another would be to focus on other aspects of the warranty – for
example, stressing the hassle-reducing benefits of the warranty (“we’ll take
care of everything…”). Another would be to exaggerate the length and
complexity of the disclosures, and to offer, helpfully, to summarize or skip
the disclosure. “Oh, yes, here’s another one of those corporate forms for
you to pretend to read and sign. I hate those things? Don’t you?” Still
another would be to threaten to walk customers out the door if they don’t
buy the insurance after reading the disclosures.135
Finally, the third prong – getting consumers to use the information.
Suppose that consumers were given the relevant data that would allow
them to compare the expected cost of repair (probability of repair × cost of
repair) with the cost of the warranty. And suppose this information were
displayed prominently and conveyed clearly. Even so, the consumer’s
decision problem is a difficult one. Consumers presumably differ in their
discount rates, and in their degree of risk aversion. We suspect that many
would not even know that paying $349 for a warranty that insures against
an 8.5 percent chance of a $400 repair is a bad deal, at least not unless the
disclosure stated: “Only a fool would purchase this product.”136 Even then
we suspect that there are plenty of salespeople who could still get
consumers to buy the insurance using the methods we described along with
others that we are not devious enough to think up.
B. BANNING ADD-ON SALES OF INSURANCE
The simplest, most straightforward way to protect consumers from
situational monopoly prices in the add-on insurance market is to prohibit
what the U.K. Competition Commission calls “point of sale purchase” of
add-on insurance products.137 This is the regulatory strategy we endorse
for extended warranties, credit life insurance, and any other add-insurance
product that could easily be purchased elsewhere, and for which immediate
135

See supra text accompanying notes 122-123. See supra pp. 42-43.
It is well known that many individuals have a very difficult time
understanding percentages. See Gerd Gigerenzer, How To Make Cognitive
Illusions Disappear: Beyond Heuristics and Biases, 2 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCH. 83
(1991).
137
COMPETITION COMMISSION, MARKET INVESTIGATION INTO PAYMENT
PROTECTION INSURANCE, Jan. 29, 2009, at 13 (U.K.). Patricia McCoy (personal
communication) points out that Congress or the Comptroller of the Currency
would also have to ban debt cancelation/suspension contracts that are very close
substitutes for credit life insurance. Otherwise, the possibility for regulatory
arbitrage would allow the transactions to continue in a new form.
136
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coverage is not truly necessary. If people really want extended warranties
or other kinds of add-on insurance for emotional risk management
purposes, they will find that insurance in all the ways that people find other
things that they want: on the internet, in the yellow pages, or through a
print or direct mail advertisement.
Our proposed ban on retailers’ sale of add-on insurance products is
similar to, but simpler and stronger than, the complex package of reforms
that the U.K. Competition Commission recommended in 2009 for payment
protection insurance.138 Payment protection insurance (PPI) is a commonly
purchased form of insurance in the UK that combines credit life insurance
with disability and unemployment protection insurance. Where credit life
insurance pays the creditor only in the event of the death of the insured, PPI
pays the creditor in the event of “involuntary unemployment or incapacity
as a result of accident or sickness.”139 The Commission found that the
common practice of selling PPI at the point of sale adversely affected
competition in the PPI market, disadvantaging, in particular, “providers of
stand-alone PPI.”140 The Commission prohibited the purchase of PPI at the
point of sale of credit, requiring creditors to wait to sell PPI until seven
days after issuing credit and mandating competition enhancing disclosures
to consumers and to a regulatory oversight body in connection with the sale
of PPI.141
We recommend a flat prohibition on the sale of most add-on
insurance by product or service retailers. We would not allow them to sell
the insurance after some cooling off window, because there are too many
ways that retailers can structure the sale of the basic product or service to
gain advantage in the insurance purchase even after the cooling off period.
The complexity of the measures that the Competition Commission imposed
to attempt to reduce this advantage makes our point. A summary
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Supra note 137 at 13 (concluding that the best approach to regulating credit
life and similar products is to simply prohibit distributors and intermediaries from
selling payment protection insurance to their credit customers within seven days of
a credit sale).
139
COMPETITION COMMISSION, PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE MARKET
INVESTIGATION ORDER 2011, 2011, at 8 (defining “PPI”) (U.K).
140
Id. at 3.
141
The Commission initially decided to prohibit entirely the purchase of PPI at
the point of sale of credit, allowing creditors to sell PPI only seven days after
issuing credit and mandating competition enhancing disclosures in connection with
the offer of PPI. After an administrative appeal, the Commission relaxed the
prohibition slightly, allowing point of sale purchase in connection with certain
retail credit arrangements (e.g., with a department store), and allowing creditors to
sell PPI to their customers one day after the credit sale in certain limited
circumstances. Id. at 2.
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description of these measures fills one half of the Commission’s Notice of
making an order, and the measures themselves comprise 80% of the fiftyfive page Order. 142 If product or service retailers were to be permitted to
sell the insurance after some kind of cooling off period, however, similar
pro-competition disclosure and reporting requirements would be necessary.
We would exclude from this prohibition the sale of damage
waivers and auto liability protection by rental car companies to customers
who do not have their own auto insurance policies. Such customers must
have liability protection from somewhere, and they should also be able to
purchase auto property damage protection. Because these customers would
otherwise remain vulnerable to the shrouded pricing dynamic, however, we
recommend that insurance commissioners employ the measures described
in subsection 4 to eliminate the situational monopoly.
C. PRICE REGULATION
Price regulation is a well-established approach to the monopoly
pricing problem,143 and has long been used in regulating insurance.
Situational monopolies for add-on insurance are not classic monopolies like
public utilities, but they present similar opportunities for monopoly pricing.
And add-on insurance does bear some resemblance to traditional insurance,
so regulating it the way we regulate many other forms of insurance might
seem plausible. We do not advocate price regulation for add-on insurance,
however, because of the transaction costs involved.
There is a vast literature critiquing price regulation in insurance.144
Much of that literature concludes that price regulation does not in fact
lower insurance prices, because the insurance market would be sufficiently
competitive in the absence of such regulation.145 That is unlikely to be the
case here: because of the shrouded pricing dynamic and the resulting
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COMPETITION COMMISSION, Order, supra note 139, § 2.1 at 8;
COMPETITION COMMISSION, Notice, supra note 139, at 1-4.
143
For a survey of regulation of monopolies, see generally Rick Geddes,
Public Utilities, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS (1999), available at http://
encyclo.findlaw.com/5940book.pdf.
144
See, e.g., Scott E. Harrington, Effects of Prior Approval Regulation in
Automobile Insurance, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE:
RESTORING COMPETITION AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY 285 (J. David
Cummins ed., 2002) (noting that rate regulation fails to reduce average rates in
competitive markets); Scott E. Harrington, Insurance Rate Regulation in the 20th
Century, 19 J. OF INS. REG. 204 (2000) (finding that prior approval rate regulation
failed to lower average rate levels or expand coverage availability in competitive
markets)..
145
E.g., Harrington, supra note 144, at 216; Id. at 309-10.
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situational monopoly, competition clearly does not constrain add-on
insurance pricing. That does not mean that price regulation is likely to be
effective, however.
In theory, prices should be set at a level that gives sellers of add-on
insurance a reasonable rate of return. In other words, regulators would
ideally set prices at the actuarially fair value plus some markup for
overhead, marketing, and profit. But just figuring out the actuarially fair
price for extended warranties on a constantly changing array of thousands
of different consumer products sold by hundreds of different retailers is a
daunting task. Estimating reasonable markups for overhead and marketing
costs constitutes another enormous problem, and the result would clearly be
subject to manipulation by retailers in obvious ways. Nevertheless, price
regulation almost certainly would be better than nothing, just not better
than our preferred alternatives.
We prefer, instead, a ban on the sale of add-on insurance by
product and service retailers, except in the limited exception described
earlier (when a significant number of consumers need immediate
coverage). For those situations we prefer eliminating the situational
monopoly in the manner we describe next.
D. BUSTING THE SITUATIONAL MONOPOLY
The final strategy is a new regulatory approach made possible by
information technology. This strategy would eliminate the situational
monopoly by obligating the entity providing the core product or service
(e.g., the car rental) to allow the customer to select a desired insurance
product through an independently operated website accessed at the point of
sale. This website would list the insurance products, features and prices,
and allow consumers to use a simple comparison tool. The insurance
selection feature of the website would be similar to – but much simpler
than – the insurance selection feature of existing health insurance exchange
websites.146 For consumers who did not want the hassle of having to
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The website for the Massachusetts health insurance exchange, known as the
Massachusetts Connector (which served as the model for the health insurance
exchange provisions of the Affordable Care Act), can be accessed at
http://www.mahealthconnector.org. The leading private health insurance exchange
is ehealth.com. The ehealth.com selection process is much more complicated than
the Massachusetts Connector process because ehealth.com cannot provide
consumers with a definitive price, due to the fact that health insurance companies
are currently authorized to engage in medical underwriting. See generally Baker,
supra note 119 (providing an examination of the distribution of health insurance
risk and responsibility under the Affordable Care Act). For research on the
complexity of health insurance choice and what to do to make that choice easier,
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choose, the website could be programmed to provide a default product
based on the consumer answering a few questions, or even without
answering any questions other than responding with a “Yes” to “Do you
want the standard protection for someone who doesn’t have their own auto
insurance policy?”147
The company providing the core product or service should be
permitted to receive a reasonable servicing fee when the customer buys the
insurance, but this fee should be based on a formula established by the state
insurance commission. The company providing the core product or service
should not be permitted to obtain any other material benefit from the
purchase of the insurance or from the operator of the independent
website.148 Otherwise, some or all of the situational monopoly profits will
continue to flow to the company providing the core product or service. To
explain why this is so, we will begin by critiquing a similarly motivated
regulatory strategy suggested by Huysentruyt and Read, who conducted the
research on extended warranties that we discussed in Part II.
Huysentruyt and Read suggested two reforms for the extended
warranty market that attempt to counteract the situational monopoly that
results from the shrouded pricing dynamic: (a) requiring retailers to give
consumers a choice among extended warranty providers at the point of
sale, and (b) allowing retailers to sell only extended warranties that were
selected through a competitive bidding process conducted “on behalf of
consumers.”149
Although we agree with H&R’s description of the market failure,
we are skeptical that their proposals would be effective. Our skepticism is
easier to explain for the first proposal: requiring retailers to give consumers
a choice. As long as the retailer gets to decide which extended warranties
to offer, obligating the retailer to offer consumers a choice will not reduce
the situational monopoly prices. If the retailer gets to decide which choices
to provide to the consumers, extended warranty providers will have to
compete to be selected by the retailer. The way to win that competition is
by offering the highest commissions to the retailer, not by offering the

see Eric Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The
Value of Choice Architecture (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law and Econ.,
Working Paper No. 13-28, 2012).
147
The website could easily be programmed to randomly assign the customer
to the standard product of one of the insurance sellers, on a turn taking basis, on
the basis of market share, or any other method that the regulator prescribed.
148
Note that add-on insurance is “insurance” for regulatory purposes in all
states when the entity providing the insurance is different than the entity that
provides the core product or service.
149
Huystentruyt & Read, supra note 95, at 216. Note that they discuss the
shrouded pricing model.
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cheapest price to consumers.150 Consumers may end up with a choice, but
the choice will be among extended warranties sold at or near the situational
monopoly price.
Our skepticism about H&R’s second proposal – competitive
bidding – takes a bit more work to explain. Initially, we shared H&R’s
intuition that a competitive bidding process would drive out the situational
monopoly prices. Our intuition shifted, however, when we realized that a
competitive bidding process would only break through the situational
monopoly if retailers did not have the ability to influence consumers’
choice among extended warranties.
If the retailer can steer the consumer to the warranty paying the
higher commission, then a warranty supplier will submit a bid that builds in
high commissions (so the retailer steers customers to the supplier’s
extended warranty). This point is pretty obvious. What is not as obvious is
the following: even if all the retailer can do is influence whether the
consumer buys a warranty (but not which warranty), warranty suppliers
will submit bids that include high commissions.151 The reason is this: if
retailers are able to influence whether the consumers buy the extended
warranties (a reasonable assumption in our view), then the retailers, in
effect, control access to those consumers who will only buy the warranty if
the retailer engages in the effort needed to persuade them to buy it. Even if
the consumer who decides to buy a warranty always chooses the lowest
priced warranty available, warranty suppliers will have to build into their
prices compensation sufficient to motivate the retailer to make the effort
needed to persuade the marginal consumer.
It would take a model that we have not created in order to work out
all of the relationships among these assumptions in order to develop a
thorough understanding of what will emerge from a competitive bidding
process for the right to offer extended warranties to consumers.
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This dynamic explains the very high prices for “forced place” auto and
homeowners insurance. It also explains the high and discriminatory prices for
credit paid by buyers of new cars who finance their purchases through the
dealership that is selling them the car. See, e.g., Coleman v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 2002) (class action suit alleging that
a car dealership’s retail credit pricing system resulted in discrimination against
African-American buyers); Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A
Competitive Conduct Standard for Assessing When Disparate Impacts are
Justified, 95 CAL. L. REV. 669, 692-717 (2007) (analyzing consumer policies in the
automobile industry that adversely affect minority purchasers).
151
Note that heterogeneity in susceptibility to retailers’ sales pressure could
help to explain the shrouded pricing dynamic, if we assume that people either are
unaware of their susceptibility or mistakenly believe that they will be able to resist
the pressure this time.
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Nevertheless, we are confident that this price will reflect compensation to
the retailer for “selling” the extended warranty to consumers who would
not buy it if the retailer didn’t put forth some costly effort to persuade
them.
H&R’s proposed reforms should be rejected for the same reasons
the retailer’s commission must be fixed by regulation and retailers cannot
be permitted to obtain any other material benefit from the customer’s
purchase of the add-on insurance. A retailer who gets a benefit from the
purchase of one kind of add-on insurance but not another will have an
incentive to steer the customer. And even if the additional benefits are the
same for all add-on insurance, those additional benefits will motivate sales
practices that induce customers to buy add-on insurance that they do not
need.
These reasons also point to a fatal weakness in the consumer
sovereignty defense of a light touch, disclosure approach to regulating
extended warranties. Recall that the consumer sovereignty challenge was
based on research supporting the view that buying extended warranties may
in at least some cases represent “sophisticated consumer behavior to
manage emotions such as anxiety, regret, and loss aversion” and “a
sophisticated and informed strategy on the part of consumers to manage
emotions that exist independently of insurers’ (and their agents’) sales
efforts.”152 Yet, as long as we accept that retailers have the capacity to
influence the number of consumers who buy the add-on insurance, we can
see that the consumer sovereignty justification actually protects (a) sales to
people who have to be persuaded, (b) a sales context that provides
significant opportunity to exploit behavioral biases, and (c) a product –
add-on insurance – that is demonstrably not in the average buyer’s financial
interest in most situations (even if some buyers can be persuaded that it will
make them feel better). Separating the buying from the selling, and the
selling from the swindling is almost certainly an impossible task.153 The
U.K. Competition Commission’s reforms did not work in this regard, and
we doubt that any real world regulator can do a better job.154 Moreover, the
shrouded pricing model demonstrates that, even if consumers value
extended warranties for legitimate, if non-standard, reasons, the market can
still be distorted in a way that leads them to pay far more than the cost of
152

Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 31.
See generally ARTHUR LEFF, SWINDLING AND SELLING (1976).
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See LECG, Ltd., Evaluating the Impact of the Supply of Extended
Warranties on Domestic Electrical Goods Order 2005, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING 7
(Oct. 2008), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/EvaluatingOFTs-work/oft1024.pdf (finding spotty compliance with the disclosure
requirements, misinformation regarding consumer rights, and other sales practices
inconsistent with legal requirements).
153
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providing the warranties in question. It is hard to imagine a “sovereign”
consumer who would prefer that situation.
The U.K. Office of Fair Trading has recently imposed a similar,
situational monopoly-busting reform of the consumer electronic extended
warranty market in the UK. Like the Competition Commission’s reform of
the PPI market, however, the OFT’s reform of the extended warranty
market contains some loopholes that significantly increase the complexity
of the regulatory apparatus.155 Simpler is better in our view. If our
situational monopoly busting reform for auto rental insurance were to be
subject to the same kinds of exceptions as the extended warranties in the
U.K. context, however, some of same kinds of regulatory complexities
would be needed to prevent the re-emergence of situational monopoly
pricing.
E. EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Under any of the approaches that would actually work – a ban,
price regulation, or busting the situational monopoly – there would be
general equilibrium effects of the sort that Justin Sydnor explored in the
homeowners’ insurance deductible context. The list prices for some
products and services would likely increase, Gabaix and Laibson’s
“sophisticates” would receive smaller subsidies from the “myopes,” and
core product sellers who depend disproportionately on profits from add-on
insurance would suffer in relation to sellers who do not. One result may be
to increase the share of internet commerce, as the British experience
suggests that traditional retailers depend more on profits from extended
warranties than internet sellers.156 This latter possibility, together with the
political clout of the numerous, geographically distributed traditional retail
establishments (and their employees and suppliers) may provide the best
explanation for why the Competition Commission failed to propose a ban
on retailers’ sale of extended warranties in 2005, and why the OFT watered
down its situational monopoly busting reform of the extended warranty
market in 2012.
Some readers – and some of the literature on extended warranties –
suggest that the resulting equilibrium might be welfare reducing, if retailers
are using the add-on insurance to engage in (welfare-enhancing) price
discrimination.157 The idea is that the excess profits from the add-on
155

See supra note 5.
See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 5, at 26.
157
By extending the size of the market via selective discounts, price
discrimination reduces deadweight loss. Suppose a monopolist’s profit-maximizing
single price for a movie ticket is $8. There are some older customers with
reservation prices of $5 who do not find it worthwhile to purchase a ticket at that
156
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insurance allow retailers to lower the price of the core product. This in turn
permits some additional sales to customers who would not buy at the
higher price that would result if our proposal were adopted. It might
ultimately be the case that the loss in welfare to those priced out of the
market for TV sets exceeds the gain in welfare to those who no longer buy
add-on insurance they don’t need (or who buy it at a discount).158 This is,
of course, an empirical question, and different people will have different
intuitions about the welfare analysis. Our intuition is that the savings to
everyone from not being “nudged,” or worse, to buy the add-on insurance,
plus the large savings to the people who don’t buy or don’t overpay for the
add-on insurance outweigh the loss in welfare from those priced out of the
market by the higher price for the base product or service. But we freely
admit that the alternative is possible (albeit unlikely in our view).
This empirical question raises the important normative question of
what we think about price discrimination based on heterogeneity in
violations of rationality, especially those that encourage sellers to exploit
cognitive and other limitations. At least in the realm of insurance, where
expected utility theory offers a powerful guide to value and society is
already committed to strong consumer protection, we are troubled by such
price discrimination, and we expect that insurance regulators are as well.
V.

CONCLUSION

We have focused on one kind of insurance that people often buy,
even though a reasonably informed, rational person would not buy it
(extended warranties) and two other kinds of insurance that makes sense
for only some of the people who buy them (rental car damage waivers and
credit life insurance) and which are just as over-priced as the first. Many of
the behavioral explanations for the gap between expected utility theory and
price. Since the marginal cost of showing the movie is zero, it is inefficient for the
older customers to be priced out of seeing it. So if the monopolist can selectively
lower the price for older customers without reducing the price it charges everyone
else, then it will earn higher revenue, the older customers will see the movie, and
other customers will be unaffected, leaving everyone better off.
158
For a basic reference, see Walter Y. Oi, A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part
Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly, 85 Q. J. ECON. 77 (1971) (explaining how
charging a flat fee plus a per-unit charge allows for greater extraction of consumer
surplus while simultaneously reducing deadweight loss). In the extended warranty
context; see Jindal, supra note 20 (raising this possibility in the context of results
that do not allow him to determine whether this is the case); Junhong Chu and
Pradeep K. Chintagunta, Quantifying the Economic Value of Warranties in the
U.S. Server Market, 28 MARKETING SCI. 99 (2009) (analyzing extended warranties
as a means of facilitating price discrimination in the U.S. server market and
estimating their price discrimination value).
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insurance purchasing practice make some sense in terms of emotional risk
management. On this view, buying these kinds of insurance comes to look
more like a conscious, understandable choice to buy something with real
value, and less like a cognitive processing mistake that we should de-bias
or ignore. If correct, this emotional risk management explanation could be
understood to support a consumer sovereignty justification for these forms
of insurance that leads directly to a light touch, disclosure approach to their
regulation.
We conclude that this line of reasoning is wrong, at least in the
case of these kinds of insurance. It fails to take into account the
equilibrium analysis of the shrouded pricing model, the supply-induced
nature of demand for these products, and the practical difficulties inherent
in the choice/mistake distinction upon which the reasoning depends.
Behavioral (and other) research has not been kind to the proposition that
disclosure corrects decisional errors.159 Precisely because consumers who
buy add-on insurance are not fully rational, frequency-of-repair statistics
and other forms of “de-biasing” education will be difficult for them to
process. Behavioral research might help to make disclosure more
effective,160 but we see no reason to be optimistic that disclosure can fully
overcome even the most minimal behavioral impediments to appropriate
decision-making. This in turn implies that the distinction between mistakes
(based on incorrect information) and non-standard preferences as motives
for insurance purchases does not provide a solid basis for regulatory policy.
Unless we define “mistakes” tautologically (as those decisions that can be
altered by disclosure), effectively correcting mistakes will often require
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See generally, e.g., Ben-Shahar and Schnieder, supra note 6 (general
literature on de-biasing, w/spotty results). Nor is financial education likely to
improve consumer decision-making. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Against
Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197 (2008) (arguing that financial
education actually leads to worse consumer decisions).
160
See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Economics Behaving Badly,
N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion/
15loewenstein.html, who write:
Behavioral economics should complement, not substitute for,
more substantive economic interventions. If traditional
economics suggests that we should have a larger price difference
between sugar-free and sugared drinks, behavioral economics
could suggest whether consumers would respond better to a
subsidy on unsweetened drinks or a tax on sugary drinks. But
that’s the most it can do. For all of its insights, behavioral
economics alone is not a viable alternative to the kinds of farreaching policies we need to tackle our nation’s challenges.

60

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 20.1

something more than disclosure, and thus entails making it difficult or
impossible for consumers to do what they “want.”
The shrouding model we have relied on so heavily in this article
offers several important insights for the application of behavioral
economics to the regulation of consumer products and services more
broadly. Most significantly, it shows that behavioral “flaws” don’t just
influence the consumer’s decision about what/how much to buy. These
flaws also shape the structure of competition between firms and the
resultant market equilibrium. An analysis that focuses only on consumers’
deviations from perfect rationality (or non-standard preferences) will miss
important properties of this equilibrium. Sadly, there is thus no short-cut
from behavioral anomaly directly to policy recommendations: rather, as
Justin Syndor’s homeowner’s insurance analysis also demonstrates, the
behavioral anomalies have to be inserted into an overall model of market
functioning to predict how policy can influence welfare.
We have proposed a three step regulatory solution to the add-on
insurance problem. First, unless there is a compelling case that a
significant group of consumers truly needs to purchase the add-on
insurance product together with the underlying product or service, the sale
of the insurance at the same time as the base product should be banned.
Second, if there is a compelling case that a significant number of
consumers truly need to purchase the insurance at the same time and place
as the base product, then regulators should consider whether it is possible
to create a transparent and competitive on-line market for the add-on
insurance. If so, then the sellers of the base product should be prohibited
from selling the add-on insurance themselves and required to provide a web
access point in their establishments or on their web pages that directs the
consumers to the on-line market. When a consumer purchases the add-on
product at a store or from a product seller’s web link, the core product or
service seller should receive a standard, state-regulated commission that
will fairly compensate the seller for the cost of maintaining the terminal or
the web link, without motivating the seller to push the add-on insurance.
Finally, if the regulator is not persuaded that it is possible to create a
transparent and competitive on-line market, then the regulator should set
the prices for the add-on insurance.

